COMMENTS AND NOTES
THE EXPANDING LIABILITY OF SECURITIES
UNDERWRITERS: FROM BARCHRIS TO
GLOBUS
President Roosevelt stated in his message to Congress concerning
the eventual Securities Act of 1933: "The purpose of the legislation I
'uggest is to protect the public with the least possible interference to
honest business.- In the recent cases of Escott v. BarChris
Construction Corp. and Gtobus v. Law Research Service, Inc.,
conduct by investment bankers deemed by the courts not to yield the
fullest possible disclosure to securities investors was held in violation
ol the Securities let. Little consideration was given to the question
ol 'interf'rence with honest business.' In examining these decisions
with reference to securities underwriters, in four critical areas, this
note seeks to establish a standard of conduct .for underwriters which
Would yield investor protection through disclosure while reflecting the
needs ofhoncost business.

Until recently investment bankers confidently assumed that their
underwriting practices were adequate to protect them from liability
when an issue subsequently. turned sour. In performing their

statutory duty of "reasonable investigation"' under the Securities
Act of 1933, many underwriting houses traditionally regarded the

issuer as having primary responsibility for the offering. Thus, a
substantial part of the underwriter's inquiry consisted of obtaining
the assurances of the issuer's officers. Moreover, the standard

indemnification agreement between underwriter and issuer seemed to
provide an easy cushion against potential liability. Furthermore,

little thought was given to the possibility of punitive damages except
where the underwriter was guilty of actual fraud.

Confidence in these practices, however, has been shaken by two
recent cases. 2 Escot v. BarChris Construction Corp.3 utilized the
seldom invoked civil liability section of the Securities Act of 1933,
'See note 21 infra and accompanying text.
See. e.g.. FORBES. Sept. I. 1968. at 23: The Wall St. Journal. May 14. 1968. at I. col. 6.
3283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
2
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section 11,1 to hold securities underwriters liable to investors where
a false -and misleading registration statement was involved in the

distribution. Significantly, the court found that the underwriters'
reliance on representations of corporate officers was insufficient to
establish their section 11 defenses of due diligence.5 The second case,
Globus v. Law Research Service. Inc.,6 held section 17(a), 7 the

general antifraud provision of the 1933 Act, to be sufficient to deny
the underwriter enforcement of his traditional issuer-underwriter
indemnification agreement. The issue of punitive damages under a
Securities Act action was also critically examined.
These two decisions have created uncertainty in four areas: (1)

the demands of section II due diligence for the lead or managing
underwriter of a public offering; (2) the demands of section II due

diligence for syndicate underwriters other than the lead underwriter;
(3) the propriety of assessing punitive damages against an
underwriter violating a federal securities law provision; and (4) the
validity of issuer-underwriter indemnification agreements in light of
possible conflicts with securities law objectives. This note explores
these four areas, attempting to formulate suggestions as to future
underwriting practices.

"DuE

DILIGENCE," LEAD UNDERWRITERS, AND

BarChris

The Underwriter'sDuty Under Section I I

When Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933, it made its
first attempt at securities regulation a "narrowly focused but highpowered effort" to guarantee "full and fair disclosure" in
connection with public offerings of securities.8 Saddling the seller
with the blame for the previous great drop in security values,
Congress sought to add to the old rule of "caveat emptor" a new
doctrine of "let the seller also beware." ' The Act was to bring
415 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).

5Although this note will consider the impact of BarChris on securities underwriters only,
the significance of the case is by no means limited to that area. For one view of the full
meaning of BarChris, see Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The
BarChris Case. 55 VA. L. REv. 1-82, 199-271 (1969).
6 F.2d (2d Cir. 1969) (CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
92,474 (Sept. 9, 1969)).
'Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964).
sCohen, -Truth in Securities" Revisited. 79 HAV. L. REV. 1340 (1966).
'H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., IstSess. 2 (1933); see Douglas & Bates, The Federal
Securities Act of 1933. 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933). The committee report also makes a strong
indictment of underwriter practices as a cause of the market collapse. See H.R. REP. No. 85,
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"truth in securities"
by putting the "burden of telling the whole
0
truth on the seller."'
Section II of the Securities Act of 1933 is illustrative of the
Act's attempt at full disclosure in public offerings." Consistent with
the Act's shifting of the burden to the seller, section II creates for
the buyer a remedy against an issuer far simpler to obtain than
recovery based on common law misrepresentation or deceit. Under
section 11, if a registration statement 2 covering a public distribution
of securities is materially misleading, a purchaser of those securities
need only establish pecuniary loss to have a civil remedy against the
issuer and a prima facie case against certain other participants13 in
the offering. Common law fraud elements of scienter and causation
need not be established," and proof of reliance is severely relaxed. 5
73d Cong., IstSess. 2 (1933). See also Folk. supra note 5, at 52; Landis. The Legislative
History ofthe Securities Act of 1933. 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 29, 30 (1959).
"H.R. REP. No. 85. 73d Cong., IstSess. 2 (1933).
"Section I I in part provides:
(a) In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective.
contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the'time of
such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may. either at law or in equity,
in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue(1) every person who signed the registration statement;
(2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar
functions) or partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the
registration statement with respect to which his liability is asserted;
(3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration statement
as being or about to become a director, person performing similar functions, or
partner;
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent
been named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration
statement, or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is
used in connection with the registration statement, with respect to the statement
in such registration statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have been
prepared or certified by him;
(5) every underwriter with respect to such security.
Securities Act of 1933 § 1i, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
"See Securities Act of 1933 § 7. 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1964) for the information required to
be contained within the registration statement.
For a brief essay on the functions and purposes of the registration statement and prospectus
under the Securities Act of 1933, with special consideration given to the principal areas of
Commission interest, see Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities
Regulation. 16 Bus. LAw. 300 (1961).
13See note I I supra.
"See 3 L. Loss. SECURIms REGULATION 1724, 1729-30 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
Loss]; Douglas & Bates, supra note 9, at 174; Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act.
43 YALE L.J. 227, 248-50 (1933).
"See 3 Loss 1725. 1729; Folk, supra note 5,at 10-11.
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Nevertheless, though the section provides for easy civil recovery by
the injured public offering buyer, the goal of section II is clearly not
compensation of the injured party. It seeks, rather, the prevention

of the initial injury through full disclosure of all material facts
relating to the offering. 8 Thus, section I1 also provides for an

affirmative defense and avoidance of liability where the individual
section 11 defendant proves that he conduicted a "reasonable

investigation" and disclosed in the registration statement all the
information which was material.' 7 The theory, then, of this statutory
scheme is that the individual participants in a public offering of a
,security who are liable in the event of a misleading registration
statement will be motivated to comply with the conduct necessary

to establish their affirmative defense and that this should, in turn,
result in full investigation and disclosure.

"[E]very underwriter with respect to such security" is included
within the parties that section 11(a) names as prospective
defendants.' 8 The underwriter is liable to an investor for a misleading
registration statement, even though he might not have been the
source of the misstatement or necessarily have had knowledge or
19 However, the underwriter, like other section
notice of it.
II
defendants other than the issuer, can relieve himself of liability

through utilization of one of several affirmative defenses available."
The most important of these is the reasonable investigation or due
diligence defense of section 1l(b)(3). 21 That provision states that no
"Shulman, supra note 14, at 253.

"Securities Act of 1933 § i1(b)(3). 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1964). The defense of
"reasonable investigation" is not available to the issuer. His is an "insurer's" liability. See
note 21 infra for the text of § I I(b)(3).
"See note I I supra.
"The responsibility of the underwriter for the veracity of statements and information
provided to the investor would also extend to an incorporated prospectus, as in BarChris The
prospectus is today regarded as a basic part of the registration statement. 3 Loss 1721-22.
"Other affirmative defenses are: That the investor knew of the misrepresentation at the time
he acquired the security, Securities Act of 1933 § II(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1964): that the
investor purchased the security after the issuer had made generally available to its securities
holders an earnings statement covering a period of at least 12 months after the effective date
of the registration statement and did not rely on the untrue statement in the registration
statement, id.: that the statute of limitations has run. id. § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m; and that
the investor's damages, in part or all, resulted from factors other than the false or misleading
registration statement (limitation on liability; not an excuse). id. § II(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e).
2
'Section II(b) in part provides:
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)of this section no person, other
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subsection (a) party other than the issuer shall be liable who can
prove that as to portions of the registration statement not based
upon the authority of an expert, he had, after reasonable
investigation, a reasonable belief in the truth of the statements made

therein, and as to portions based upon the authority of an expert,
he had no reason to believe that the information in the registration
statement was false. The two standards obviously vary significantly.

As to the expertised portions of the registration statement, the
underwriter establishes his defense by simply proving a lack of
knowledge, while to avoid liability for non-expertised portions, he
must show an affirmative investigation of the facts underlying his
belief that the registration statement is not misleading." However,
the standard of reasonableness adopted in each instance is that of a
"prudent man in the management of his own property."' Equally
than the issuer, shall be liable as provided therein who shall sustain the burden of
proof(3) that (A) as regards any part of the registration statement not purporting
to be made on the authority of an expert, and not purporting to be a copy of
or extract from a report or valuation of an expert, and not purporting to be
made on the authority of a public official document or statement, he had, after
reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the
time such part of the registration statement became effective, that the statements
therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact required
to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading;
I . . and (C) as regards any part of the registration statement purporting to be
made on the authority of an expert (other than himself) or purporting to be a
copy of or extract from a report or valuation of an expert (other than himself),
he had no reasonable ground to believe and did not believe, at the time such
part of the registration statement became effective, that the statements therein
were untrue or that there was an omission to state a material fact required to
be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading,
or that such part of the registration statement did not fairly represent the
statement of the expert or was not a fair copy of or extract from the report or
valuation of the expert ....
Securities Act of 1933 § II(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(1964). Note that the due diligence
defense is not available to the issuer.
Although they will not be specifically considered in this note, the underwriter has been held
to owe duties of reasonable care to the investor under sections 12 and 17 of the Securities
Act, and sections 10(b) and 15(c) of the Exchange Act. See Charles E. Bailey & Co., 35
S.E.C. 33, 41 (1953); Symposium-Current Problemsof Securities Underwritersand Dealers.
18 Bus. LAw. 27, 38 (1962).
'The language of section iI (b)(3)(C) seemingly implies the necessity of some element of
'totice" of the falsity in the expertised portion of the registration statement, before liability
would attach. However, as to non-expertised portions, notice of the falsity is apparently not a
prerequisite to liability. See notes 40-41 infra and accompanying text.
"Securities Act of 1933 § I1(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1964). This is substantially the same
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important, though sometimes forgotten, is the statute's requirement
that due diligence be shown by the underwriter up to and as of the
effective date of the registration statement.2
Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.: One Underwriter'sAttempt
at Due Diligence
The rigid buyer-oriented provisions of section I1 quickly
prompted many commentators to attack the section as a threat to
investment. 2 Few actions, however, were ever brought under the
provision. Therefore, few judicial definitions were added to the
statutory terms of the section, particularly the due diligence
language, and underwriters continued in practices with no guidance
as to sufficiency. In the now famous Escott v. BarChris
Construction Corp. 6 case, however, section II finally became the
center of judicial activity.
standard as that adopted in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959). 3 Loss
1726.
2
See note 21 supra.
2As originally conceived, the "'absolute" nature of the liability imposed by section II
rendered it a probable threat to investment banking. See 3 Loss 1721; Cohen, supra note 8.
at 1355; Dean, The Federal Securities Act: I. FORTUNE, Aug., 1933, at 50, 100-02; Douglas
& Bates, supra note 9, at 192. However, the threat was never realized, since the section resulted
in, prior to BarChris. about 30 cases, only two recoveries, and five judicially approved
settlements. See Loss, The Opinion. 24 Bus. LAW. 527, 531 (1969). A number of reasons have
been advanced for the paucity of litigation under section II. Some say the silence was due to
the success of the in terrorem operation of the statute. See Cohen. supra at 1355. However. it
is clear that many smaller underwriting houses do little investigating, wrongfully relying on
the SEC inspection of the registration statement to indicate areas of weakness. .See REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND ErXCHANOE

COMMISSION. H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.. IstSess. pt. I. 514 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
SPECIAL STUDY]. Another reason suggested for the few recoveries under section II is that
many claims under that section may be pressed under the general antifraud sections of the
securities acts. On this point, it has been suggested that if a court were ever faced with a set
of facts which created a conflict between a section I I cause and a lOb-5 claim, the court would
allow the former to override the latter because of the intricate scheme which Congress drafted
for civil liability under section II. See Loss, The Opinion. 24 Bus. LAW 527. 534 (1969). A
final suggestion is that the paucity can be traced to the detailed consideration of the
registration statement and prbspectus done by the Commission, and the threat posed by its
tool of stop-order proceedings. However, it is apparent that the Commission manpower
limitations may not permit so detailed a consideration of every offering in the future. See
SPECIAL STUDY Pt. I.514; SEC Securities Act Release No. 4944, Exchange Act Release No.
8496 (January 15. 1969). [1968-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FFn. SEC. L. REP. i 77. 645.
at 83. 392 (Jan. 15. 1969).
21283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y 1968). The case has been a fertile source for commentary
See. e.g.. Folk. 'upra note 5, Srnpostunt - The BarChri% Case "Prospectus Liabilitr. '24
BLs LA%%
523 1969): Comment, Bar Chris Due Diligence Refined. 68 COLUM. L REv. 1411
(1968).
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BarChris manufactured and installed bowling alleys. Caught in
the whirlwind growth of the industry in the late 1950's and early
1960's, the corporation resorted to a public offering of debentures
in 1961 to obtain working capital.2 The accompanying registration

statement and incorporated prospectus, however, were misleading as
to several material facts.2s Shortly thereafter, it became apparent

that the bowling industry was overbuilt. By October 1962, BarChris
was in bankruptcy, and on November 1 of that year the company

defaulted in payment of interest due on the debentures. The
debenture purchasers instituted a class action, naming as defendants,
among others, eight underwriting houses led by Drexel & Co. 29 The
court found the registration statement and prospectus false and
misleading, and held that as to the non-expertised portions of the

material, none of the defendants had established his due diligence
defense.31

In BarChris, Drexel, the lead underwriter, unsuccessfully
attempted to establish due diligence based on an investigation
7
The offering was of $3,500,000 subordinated convertible 15-year debentures with an
interest rate of approximately 5 %. 283 F. Supp. at 652.
28Misrepresentation occurred in the prospectus and registration statement as to the
prospective use of the proceeds of the issue, the corporation's backlog of orders, customer
delinquencies, loans made to the corporation by its officers, and the repossession and operation
of alleys by the corporation. Most of these facts, if made known to the investor, arguably
would have indicated the overbuilt condition of the bowling alley construction industry. 283
F. Supp. at 668-78. There were several other areas of misstatement, but they did not affect
the underwriter's liability, either because they were not material or because they appeared in
the expertised portion of the registration statement and prospectus for which the underwriters
satisfied due diligence. 283 F. Supp. at 680-82, 697.
"The defendant underwriting houses, led by Drexel & Co., were: Hemphill, Noyes & Co.;
Paine, Webber, Jackson a Curtis; Salomon Brothers & Hutzler; Peter Morgan & Company:
Blair & Co.; G.H. Walker & Co.; and Ira Haupt & Co. Ira Haupt & Co. went bankrupt prior
to the date of the opinion, and the action was severed as against them. Other defendants
included eight directors of the issuer, one officer, one director who was also a partner of Drexel
& Co., and the independent accountants. 283 F. Supp. at 652 & n.I.
30283 F. Supp. at 697. Drexel had delegated certain of its investigatory duties to its counsel.
Judge McLean found that the underwriters' counsel, acting as agent for Drexel. had failed to
make a reasonable investigation. Drexel and the other underwriters were bound by that failure.
Id.
Underwriters' counsel commonly perform a major part of the managing underwriter's
investigatory requirement, dealing in mixed questions of law, as a lawyer giving advice, and
of fact, as agent of the underwriter. For a discussion of the potential liability of underwriters'
counsel, see Henkel, Liability ofa Counsel for Lnderwriier. 24 Bus. LAW. 641 (1969).
As to the expertised portion of the registration statement, Judge McLean held that the
underwriters had established due diligence. They had no reason to believe and did not believe
that the information provided by the accountants was untrue. Id. See note 21 supra.
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apparently comparable to the existing general practices of the
investment banking community.31 That investigation, for the most
part conducted by the underwriters' counsel, 3 consisted of three
phases. The first or preliminary stage was conducted by Drexel prior
to its decision to finance, and it consisted of a general evaluation of
past financial reports of BarChris and other companies in the
industry, contacts with references, and a credit check of the issuer. 3
These acts revealed nothing questionable.3 Once Drexel had decided
to underwrite the offering, its investigation moved into a second
stage, consisting of a series of meetings between Drexel and counsel,
the officers and directors of the issuer, and the accountants. This
phase was primarily directed at the preparation of the prospectus
and registration statement. During these meetings, every point of
eventual misstatement was raised by the underwriters in questions
put to corporate officials, and, though the points were discussed, no
verification of the representations of management was made either
by the underwriters or their counsel. Thus, the statements of the
issuer were taken as the ultimate source of the underwriters'
information.3
There was an attempt at verification in the third stage of Drexel's
investigation, which consisted of the customary trip by a junior
associate of underwriters' counsel to the company's offices to
3
examine the corporate records. Even this perfunctory investigation 1
revealed contradictions of prior statements made by the issuer as to
the company's operation of alleys, and also revealed that certain
corporate minutes were missing. No request was made for the
missing minutes and, again, reassurances of corporate counsel were
3'Compare Drexel's investigation with the procedures outlined by one underwriting house
SPECIAL STUDY Pt. 1, 513.
u283 F. Supp. at 692, 697.
'See SPECIAL STUDY pt. 1. 513; Douglas & Bates. Some 'f.fiets of th Set'triih's Ic' t'pon
lntw,stment Banking. I U. CHI. L. REv. 283, 284 (1933).
'Coleman, a partner of Drexel & Co., was sufficiently optimistic about BarChris after the

in the

preliminary investigation not only to go forward with the financing but to buy 1000 shares of
BarChris stock. 283 F.Supp. at 693.
3"Coleman and Ballard asked pertinent questions and received answers which satisfied
them. . . . ['rhe underwriters' counsel made almost no attempt to verify management's
representations. I hold that that was insufficient." Id. at 693, 697.
"[Stanton] did not examine the contracts with customers. He did not look to see what
contracts comprised the backlog figure. Stanton examined no accounting records of BarChris.
His visit, which lasted one day, was devoted primarily to reading the directors' minutes." Id.
at 694.
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taken without verification by other dataY7 Several crucial areas of
corporate records were never examined, 3 8 and apparently all

investigation was terminated a week before closing. 9 Arguably, it
was this final investigatory stage which most exemplified the

problem facing the court in BarChris. These concluding efforts
indicated a definite recognition by Drexel and its counsel of some

duty to verify the representations of the issuer's management, yet
illustrated the inadequacy of the practices employed to fulfill that
duty.' 0

In dealing with the question of underwriters' due diligence in
BarChris, Judge McLean went directly to the language and policy

of the statute. He rejected the underwriters' argument that they were
entitled to rely on the representations and statements of management
to satisfy due diligence as to non-expertised portions of the offering
material. Such an inquiry was held inherently defective in a setting
of natural adversity of interest, where puffing and self-serving

statements by the issuer were always possible if not probable.
Moreover, the 1933 Act was designed to safeguard the investor by

fostering a separate, impartial investigation and full disclosure, and
to this end the underwriter is made responsible for the veracity of
rBallard, of the underwriters' counsel, conversed with the chief financial officer on the two
matters but pursued the issue no further. As to Ballard's action in regard to the missing
minutes. Judge McLean said: "Ballard did not insist that the executive committee minutes be
written up so that he could inspect them, although he testified that he knew from experience
that executive committee minutes may be extremely important. If he had insisted, he would
have found the minutes highly informative .
Id. at 695.
'See note 36 vupra.
11283 F. Supp. at 695.
"Coleman. a partner of the lead underwriting house, maintained that Drexel and its counsel
had an understanding in which Drexel expected its attorneys to inspect corporate records,
including but not limited to all minutes. By instructing Stanton, counsel's junior associate, to
visit the corporate offices, the attorneys indicated a recognition of this understanding. Yet,
counsel apparently went little beyond this, since the formal opinion of counsel to the
underwriters disclaimed any attempt to verify information supplied by the management and
company counsel. Id. at 696.
It seems fair to say that this stage of the underwriter's investigation will have to undergo
the most extensive change. Information solicited from corporate officers would still seem to
be a good place for the underwriter's investigation to begin. The third stage might then become
essentially a verfication process of the management representations using corporate records,
with inconsistencies indicating areas of difficulty, into which the underwriter would probe
more intensively. Every statement of the issuer, assuming it went to a material fact of the
registration statement would, however, have to be checked against some corporate data.
BarChris clearly says that the underwriter can not expect the inconsistency or difficulty to be
indicated by the officers' statements alone. See note 41 infra.
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the statement, unless he can demonstrate a "reasonable
investigation." Thus, to hold the underwriters only to a duty of
''accurate reporting . . . of data presented to them by the
company" would obviously afford the investor no additional
protection, and would render nugatory the statutory promise that the
underwriter was individually and separately responsible- for the
registration statement and prospectus. Rather, as stated by Judge
McLean, such a duty should properly carry a "prudent man in the
management of his own property beyond the naturally optimistic,
self-serving words of management." 4'
The Fundamental Question Unresolved by BarChris
How far beyond the words of management was the underwriter
supposed to go? What are the requirements of underwriter
investigatory due care? On this point, BarChris offers little if any
help in the way of specific, positive direction or enumeration. This
failure might be criticized as forcing the underwriter to operate in
an atmosphere of extreme uncertainty. Yet the lack of detail seems
justified if viewed in light of the great variety of situations
conceivable in each case and the possibility that any suggested
minimum standards might become the maximum in practice.
However, BarChris does carry several important messages of value
in determining the tack of a future court in ascertaining the
underwriter investigation necessary to satisfy due diligence. First,
BarChris says reliance solely on management's representations is
insufficient. Although Judge McLean restricts this statement to the
"present case, 4 2 his general reasoning clearly implies that such
reliance alone would not be the conduct of a prudent man in the
management of his own property, even in the case of the most
established and trusted issuer 4 3 Second, BarChris suggests that the
""Stated another way. is it sufficient to ask questions, to obtain answers which if true.
would be thought satisfactory. and to let it go at that, without seeking to ascertain from the
records whether the answers in fact are true and complete? I have already held this procedure
is not sufficient .
283 F. Supp. at 696.
12Id. at 697.
1See note 40 supra and accompanying text. Clearly there is nothing new in the proposition
that reliance on management does not satisfy due care. The SEC had adopted this view in
cases such as The Richmniond Corp.. 41 S.E.C. 398 (1963). And this view was no secret: "The
question of whether the underwriter has made an adequate investigation seems more likely to
arise than it did before. What the outlines of actual liability may be remain yet to be tested.
but certainly there is something here which the Commission regards as vitally important and
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most detailed, independent verification possible of every material
representation in the prospectus is not required in every case, to
satisfy due diligence. This seems implicit in Judge McLean's
statement of the impossibility of constructing a rigid rule to fit all

cases44 and finds support in the prudent man standard of section
11 (c).4 5 Subsequent decisions on underwriter due diligence, therefore,
will likely seek an accommodation of reliance on management's

representations or other secondary data prepared by management
and verification by independent investigation.
The Guidelinesof Legislative History

The legislative history of the Securities Act provides some
instruction for ascertaining a proper accommodation between
independent verification and reliance. The House committee report

accompanying the bill declared that "[tihe duty of care to discover
varies in its demands upon participants in security distribution [I]
with the importance of their place in the scheme of distribution and

[2] with the degree of protection that the public has a right to

expect." 4 The role assumed by the investment banker in a new

offering is a critical one. The underwriters' work in the preparation
and distribution of a new issue is of significant importance to the

success of the offering. Likewise, his role as middleman guaranteeing
capital to the issuer is crucial. Indeed, Judge McLean's dictum in

BarChris that the prospectus must be considered as much the
underwriters' as the issuer's rejects any previous view that, at least

as to that document, the underwriters occupied a lesser position in
which our clients have got to take account of when they take an underwriter's responsibility."
Svnypostiunh supra note 21, at 42.
11283 F. Supp. at 697.
4'See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
11H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., istSess. 9 (1933).
The legislative history of the Act raises other important considerations. For instance, the
Conference Report accompanying the bill indicates that an 'insurer's" liability was
specifically rejected for all section 1I parties other than the issuer. H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d
Cong., IstSess. 26 (1933). Therefore, constructing investigatory due diligence requirements
so high as to, in effect, require the underwriter to guarantee the absolute accuracy of every
representation made would be to run afoul of this congressional consideration. The objective
of the Act is to impart a "duty of competence as well as innocence," not absolute accuracy.
Another directive is embodied within President Roosevelt's message to Congress on the bill.
"The purpose of the legislation I suggest is to protect the public with the least possible
interference to honest business." Id. at 1-2. See notes 53-56 infra and accompanying text.
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the statutory scheme." However, the underwriters' role is not a static
one, but changes according to the facts presented by each issuer. If
the issuer is engaged in his first public capital solicitation, he likely
will be unfamiliar with the requirements of the registration process.
In that case, the role of the underwriter would be correspondingly
greater than where an experienced issuer is involved.
In determining the degree of protection that the investor may
justifiably expect of the underwriter, at least two factors should be

considered. First, as to non-expertised portions of the registration
statement, the underwriter is the only section I I party occupying a

position outside the issuer's corporate structure.4" Those within the
corporation might be expected, not unnaturally, to assume a less
than critical stance toward the optimistic hopes and expectations of
their business. Thus, the investor could reasonably expect that the
underwriter would foresee the possibility of self-serving or even

deliberately false statements from management, and verify them. A
Securities and Exchange Commission decision, The Richmond

Corp.,4 suggested a second factor inflating the expectations of the
investor-endorsement of the issue by the underwriter. In
Richmond. the Commission, in holding the underwriter's token
investigation insufficient, said that the underwriter, by associating
himself with a proposed offering, implies an "investigation in
accordance with professional standards," upon which "investors
properly rely."s' Thus, by putting his name on the prospectus, the
The underwriters say that the prospectus is the company's prospectus, not theirs.
Doubtless this is the way they customarily regard it. But the Securities Act makes no
such distinction. The underwriters are just as responsible as the company if the
prospectus is false.
The purpose of Section 11 is to protect investors. To that end the underwriters are
made responsible for the truth of the prospectus.
at 696-97.
""In a sense, the positions of the underwriter and the company's officers are adverse." 283
F. Supp. at 696. The BarChrls utilization of the point of adversity of interest, however, is
less than crystal clear, since it is difficult to determine whether Judge McLean was suggesting
that the relationship between the issuer and the underwriter is naturally adverse or whether
he was indicating he felt it should be adverse. If the former were the court's position, arguably
that fails to consider a strong common interest of the two in the success of the offering, which
may become dominant as the preparation nears completion. Nevertheless, the point is
academic, since, regardless of the natural setting, the fact remains that the position of the
underwriter, uniquely outside the corporate framework, both permits and necessitates that the
underwriter assume the role of skeptic and watchdog for the public as to information provided
by the corporate officers.
"41 S.E.C. 398 (1963).
at 406. "'Origination of an issue has always carried with it the implied endorsement
by the originating banker of the financial integrity of the issuer and the merits of the security."
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underwriter has, in effect, endorsed it.-" The endorsement factor,
however, would seem to require an inquiry into the reputation of the
issuer and the underwriter, as well as the investor's knowledge
thereof. Therefore, if the issuer is well established, courts should
regard the underwriter's implied endorsement as being of doubtful
value to the investor. Likewise, if the underwriter is an unknown,
arguably the implied endorsement would mean little to the investor. 2
The Circumstances Presented by the Individual Issuer

Since the circumstances of the issuer necessarily affect the
importance of the underwriter's role in the distribution, as well as
the reliance which investors place on the underwriter's name, all
significant facts regarding the issuer should be considered in
determining whether the underwriter has established his due diligence
defense. Elements such as the age, size, stability, and type of product
of the issuer and issuer's industry, as well as the nature of the
security being offered and the purposes of the financing are
pertinent. The corporation going public for the first time would
demand a more intensive investigation than that required for the
more established public business. The underwriter's importance in
the scheme of distribution would seem to be inversely related to the
experience of the issuer. Thus, the investor might more justifiably
rely on the underwriter's implied endorsement and assurance of due
care where uncertainty surrounds the issuer. Similarly, the
corporation expanding production of a proven market winner would
presumably require a less extensive investigation by the underwriter
than an issuer entering a high risk market with an untried product.
Furthermore, if the corporate security being offered is, for example,
a convertible debenture, where investor interest would be in growth
rather than in profits, the investor would seem justified in expecting
Halleran & Calderwood, Effects of Federal Regulation on Distribution of and Trading in
Securities. 28 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 86, 89 (1959).
S1PRACTISING LAw INSTITUTE. WHEN CORIPORATIONS GO PUBLIC 43 (C. Israels & G. Duff

eds. 1962).
"An underwriter might argue that he had such a bad reputation that the investor could place

little or no reliance on his "endorsement" and that, therefore, his required investigation would
be significantly less than one of a more reputable house. This is easily rejected, however,

because the investor is always guaranteed at least the minimum standard of the practice. See
text accompanying note 50 supra.
For a general look at how certain policy considerations help to establish the scope of section
II due diligence for the underwriter, see Folk. supra note 5,at 54-56.
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the underwriter to take a more skeptical look at the growth-decay
indicia of the issuer. If a contract, basic agreement, or a series of
transactions is of extreme importance to the corporation, the
potential for management "optimism" in that area should be duly
counteracted by detailed, independent verification, especially if the
contracts, agreements, or transactions are few in number. Finally,
all basic corporate records such as minutes are of extreme
importance, though the requirement of investigation might be subject
to a variable condition of ease of access or availability.
Economic Considerations as a Limiting Factor on the Detail of
In vestigat ion
Given the facts of the situation and the general objectives of
congressional history, there is an important constant limitation
which must be considered in establishing the due care requirements
for an underwriter. Economic considerations clearly suggest that
there is a point of diminishing returns where the cost of underwriter
investigation outweighs the marginal returns to investors in terms of
additional disclosure and confidence in the registration statement.53
Any increase in the detail of investigation means additional costs
and time requirements to the underwriter. To the extent that
reputable houses are unable to expand operations to meet additional
time demands, fewer issues will be underwritten by them and the
overall quality of disclosure could decline. Also, the additional cost
might likely be shifted to the issuer through a larger underwriter
discount. Therefore, the cost of public capital to businessmen and
entrepreneurs will correspondingly rise. An inability of the issuer to
pass on the increased cost to the investor may have several results.
One apparently beneficial result would be to keep high risk,
unseasoned companies off the public securities market. Yet how
beneficial is this if it denies a promising company access to public
capital that it may critically need? If, however, the company does
decide on public financing, it may choose the less expensive, less
responsible, and less careful underwriting house, in which case the
investor suffers. 4 Moreover, a marginal returns approach to the
-Se3ee generally Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Market'. 19 Bus. LAW. 721

(1964).

"1See SPECIAL STUDY pt. 1,493-95. 513-14. -(A] host of impecunious persons (not
necessarily strawmen) may appear and take over, perhaps the name but not the function of,
origination and underwriting." Douglas & Bates. supra note 33. at 305.
For a general look at underwriter compensation, the principal cost of going public. see
SPECIAL STUDY pt. 1. 502-12.
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determination of section 11 due diligence is implicit in President
Roosevelt's injunction that the protection of the investor through

securities regulation should be achieved with the least possible
interference to honest business. 55 Indeed, this declaration carries the

message to the courts that theoretical extremes of the duty to
investigate must be compromised with practical results and
expense. 56
PARTICIPATING UNDERWI'ITIR

"DUE DILIGENCE" AFTER BarChris

The practice employed in most public offerings is for a number
of investment banking houses to form a group or syndicate to
underwrite the issuer's capital solicitation. 57 As a consequence of the
numerous underwriting houses in the normal group, most members
take only a small portion of an offering, thus reducing their
individual profit or "spread." In addition, the underwriter who
manages the offering, by virtue of the agreement among the
underwriters, has come to play an increasingly important role,
acting for the entire group throughout the various stages of the
underwriting. 5 Thus, the BarChris consideration of underwriter due
diligence raises the question of what conduct syndicate underwriters
must employ in order to satisfy investigatory due care 9
55See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
5
For specific suggestions as to underwriter investigation, see Symposium. supra note 21,
at 90. revised June 15, 1968, in Section. of Corporation. Banking and Business Law of the
4-nerican Bar 4ssociation in SELECTED ESSAYS ON FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 65 (H.Wander
& W. Guerrenlerger eds. 1968).
For additional examination in the area of the underwriter's investigation. see The Richmond
Corp., 41 S.E.C. 398 (1963); Archie H. Chevrier (S.E.C.. June 25, 1962) (order for
proceedings): In re Charles E. Bailey & Co., 35 S.E.C. 33, 41 (1953); Garey & Best, Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 6841 (July 9,1962); Brown, Barton & Engel. Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 6821 (June 8, 1962); Memorandum, Amos Treat & Co., SEC File No. 84871 (April I, 1962). See also Wheat & Blackstone, Guideposts for a First Public Offering.
15 Bus. LAW. 539 (1960).
"7 This practice resulted from the Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162 (1933), commonly
referred to as the "Glass-Steagall Act," which set capital ceilings for investment bankers at
such a level that a single underwriter could no longer risk the entire underwriting of the
modern large offering. Also, the Securities Act of 1933, by limiting the civil liability of the
underwriter of an offering to the amount of his undertaking, encouraged a division of the large
offerings among a number of houses. See United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 630,
646-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1953): Halleran &Calderwood, supra note 50. at 98-99.
"See Douglas & Bates, supra note 33, at 284-85; Halleran & Calderwood, supra note 50, at
99-100. For a discussion of different roles played by the originating house and the
participating syndicate houses, see United States v. Morgan, 118 -F. Supp. 621, 647-48
(S.D.N.Y. 1953); Douglas & Bates. supra note 9. at 199 n. 160.
"Syndicate due diligence has been the source of much remark but little exposition. See
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The issue of syndicate due diligence originates in the language of

the Securities Act itself. Section 2(11),10 in defining "underwriter"
for the purposes of the statute, clearly includes both the main or
originating underwriter and all participating members in the group.'
Section I1(a),12 in holding every underwriter liable for deficiencies in
the registration statement, makes no differentiation between the lead
and the syndicate underwriters.53 Therefore, assuming the
registration statement of a public offering of securities is materially
misleading, the participating underwriters, just as the lead
underwriter, must establish due diligence to relieve themselves of
liability.
Given the present system of syndicate underwriting, what must
participating underwriters do in order to establish section I I(b)(3)
due diligence?" The resolution of that problem would seem to raise
three questions. First, what investigatory duties does section II (b)(3)
place on the participating underwriter? Second, can syndicate
members discharge these duties by delegating the obligations, in
generally 3 Loss 1726; Douglas & Bates. supra note 9, at 201-02; Landis. Liabili' Sections
of the Securiier: Act. 18 AM. ACCOUNTANT 330, 332 (1933); Svntposium. supra note 21, at
42.
In the BarChris case, participating underwriters argued that their delegation of all section
I I(b)(3) investigatory obligations to the managing underwriter and their reliance on his efforts
was a discharge of section II due diligence. However, since the BarChris court found
insufficient the investigation upon which the participating underwriters were seeking to rely,
it never reached the question of whether syndicate underwriters could, in fact, rely on the
conduct of the managing underwriter. 283 F. Supp. at 697 n.26.
" 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11)(1964).
"Section 2( 1) defines "underwriter" as follows:
(11) The term "underwriter" means any person who has purchased from an issuer
with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with. the distribution of
any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any such
undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct or indirect underwriting
or any undertaking; but such term shall not include a person whose interest is limited
to a commission from an underwriter or dealer not in excess of the usual and customary
distributors' or sellers' commission. . ..Id.
It was clearly the legislative intention to draw section 2(1 1) broad enough to include the
syndicate participating underwriters. See H.R. ReP. No. 85. 73d Cong.. IstSess. 11 (1933).
See also Cohen, supra note 8, at 1395. '[A]nyone who purchases from an issuer with other
than an investment intent may turn out to be a statutory underwriter." i. at 1404 n. 19 1.
For a detailed consideration of the definition of "underwriter." see I Loss 547-57.
"See note I I supra for the text of section II(a).
"On the Act's treatment of the various investment banking functions. it was said: "Those
functions are scarcely differentiated by the Act. It makes no distinction in terms between
originating houses and other underwriters, nor between principal underwriters and subunderwriters." Douglas & Bates, supra note 33. at 283-84.
"See note 21 miipra for the text or section II (b)(3).
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whole or in part, to the lead underwriter? Finally, does delegation
to a responsible managing underwriter operate as a total discharge
of the duties for the purpose of section 11 (a) liability?
Section 11 Investigatory Requirements for Participating
Underwriters
Before approaching the question of discharge of due diligence
requirements, an initial determination of the obligations imposed on
syndicate underwriters by section 11 must be made. That
determination would seem to begin with the test suggested by the
congressional history of the Securities Act: Section 11 (b)(3) due care
varies (1) with the importance of the place of the offering participant
in the security distribution and (2) with the degree of protection
which the investor could rightfully expect."
At least two factors indicate that participating underwriters play
a lesser role in the total scheme of distribution of a public offering,
thereby implying that a different standard of due diligence exists for
them. First, syndicate underwriters play a small part in the
preparation of the usual offering." The managing underwriter is the
deputy of the group and acts for all members throughout the
underwriting process. Moreover, sine investors likely place little
reliance on the inclusion of syndicate members in the offering,
attributing any "implied endorsement" to participating underwriters
would be artificial. 7 Secorld, in a large public offering, most
participating underwriters take a very small portion of the issue,
and, therefore, have a relatively small financial position in the
distributive scheme. Thus, since syndicate underwriters apparently
play practically no part in the total preparation of a public offering
but rather are included primarily because .of their capital and for
purposes of risk distribution, it could reasonably be argued that
section I l(b)(3) would require significantly less investigatory
conduct from them for due diligence."
"Sce notes 46-52 supra and accompanying text.
"See United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 647-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Douglas &
Bates, supra note 9, at 199 n. 160.
"See text accompanying notes 50-51.
uSyndicate underwriters in BarChris advanced the proposition that they should have a lower
measure of duty commensurate with the role they actually assumed in the scheme of
distribution but apparently did not press the contention to any significant extent. See Trial
Memorandum No. 2 for Defendant Underwriters and B.D. Coleman at 112-13.
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Such a determination, however, is not without difficulties."
Initially, there is nothing within the terms of section 1I that would

sanction such a differentiation between the managing underwriter
and other members of the underwriting group.70 Although the

"prudent man" rule of section 11(c)7' might lend some support to
the lesser due care standard, arguably, that rule goes to assessing the
sufficiency of conduct in discharge of section 11 (b)(3) due diligence

rather than to construction of the standard itself. Also, making
section ll(b)(3) due diligence requirements of participating

underwriters a function of the position within the underwriting they
voluntarily assume would apparently beg the very question of what
role they are required to assume. Thus, a court might conceivably

say that the section II disclosure scheme requires all underwriters
to assume a major investigatory position in the offering preparation.
Finally, establishing a standard of investigatory due care for
participating underwriters less than that required of the managing

underwriter raises difficult problems of eventual liability, since
syndicate underwriters might possibly satisfy section II (b)(3) and
avoid liability where the lead underwriter did not. Arguably, such a
possibility would run counter to the section II(e) limitation of
underwriter liability which implies that the underwriters of a public

offering should stand or fall together in their attempts to satisfy due
diligence.72 More likely, then, section 11 (b)(3) does not distinguish
between underwriters of a given group, but rather requires, at least
on paper, a full investigation by each underwriting house.7 3
"If the section II due diligence standard for each underwriter were determined to be a
function of the percentage of the offering underwritten by the underwriter, an almost
unworkable test would be created. At what particular percentage of the whole offering would
the requirement of full investigation attach? If 100 underwriters formed a group and each
underwriter took one percent of the offering, are any of the underwriters required to perform
a full investigation? Are all required?
7*See note 63 supra.
" See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
7 Section II(e) provides in part: "in no event shall any underwriter .
be liable in any
suit or as a consequence of suits authorized under subsection (a) of this section for damages
in excess of the total price at which the securities underwritten by him and distributed to the
public were offered to the public." 15 U.S.C. § 77(e)(1964).
13A third possible standard for syndicate underwriter due diligence might exist. Based on a
theory that all underwriters of the group are in the same boat pulling together for the same
goal, the statute might be interpreted to require of the group one full investigation to be
performed as the group members deem best. No examination of the requirements of section
I l(b)(3) for the individual member would be required. All members of the group would of
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Discharge of Due Care Obligations by Participating Underwriters
Through Delegation to the Managing Underwriter
Can Participating Underwriters Delegate Investigator'
7 If section 11 (b)(3) establishes
Obligations?
a requirement of a full
investigation by each syndicate underwriter, the question then
becomes whether participating houses can deputize one underwriter
of the group, the lead underwriter, to discharge some or all of the
investigatory obligations.7 5 Two considerations suggest perhaps not.
First, since the syndicate system of underwriting with its dominant
managing underwriter and lesser participating houses was well
established at the time of enactment of the Securities Act, 76 the

failure of Congress in drafting the Act to differentiate between lead
and syndicate underwriters7 7 or in any way expressly to sanction
delegation by participating underwriters to the managing
underwriter arguably carries an implicit disapproval of the practice
for purposes of section 1l(b)(3).1 8 Second, syndicate underwriters'
course be liable if the group failed to produce the required investigation. C1 United States v.
Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621,690 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
"Syndicate underwriters are apparently operating today under the assumption that the lead
underwriter can properly act for the group. Some uncertainty is created, however, by the
underwriting agreement in which the underwriters uniformly state that they are acting
"severally not jointly." Nevertheless, this clause likely exists for the sole purpose of limiting
the liability of the individual underwriter under the underwriting agreement with the issuer to
the amount he actually underwrites. The agreement among the underwriters which calls for
the lead house to act for the group and the separate fee which the syndicate pays to the
managing underwriter for his work seem to establish the deputization relationship. However,
if this agreement does not sufficiently support the relationship, the agreement could easily be
amended by the underwriters to accomplish the purpose. See Symposim., supra note 26. at
615.
"Professor Landis thought the right to delegate would be inherent in the concept of the
"prudent man" standard:
These conceptions permitting a reasonable delegation of duties by the various parties
connected with the flotation of an issue, are not interfered with by that provision of
Section II which likens the standard of reasonableness to be applied, to that which the
law commonly requires of a person occupying a fiduciary relationship. That section
does not make these individuals fiduciaries in and of themselves, but simply refers to
that standard which, briefly stated, requires the exercise of a degree of care that a
prudent man would exercise in his own affairs, as a measure of the type of conduct
that in decency can be expected of those soliciting other peoples' money for investment.
Landis, supra note 59, at 332.
7
See generally United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), for a short
history of the underwriting practice.
7See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
"Section II expressly authorizes reliance only on "experts." See note 21 supra. The
underwriter is clearly not an expert within the meaning of section 11.
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delegation to the lead underwriter seems clearly invalid under the
BarChris test which measured the reasonableness of the efforts of a

section 11(a) defendant in terms of the additional protection
afforded the investor.7' Little, if any, investigatory protection and
disclosure is provided by participating underwriters who delegate

investigatory obligations to another who would be making the same
investigation regardless of thq initial delegation of duties.80
Yet such strict adherence to any requirement of affirmative
action in section 1l(b)(3) would seem nearly catastrophic to the
present-day method of offering securities to the public. Aside from
the financial waste that would result from the numerous duplicate
investigations, requiring each underwriter of an offering to make a
detailed investigation would likely be a practical impossibility.8
Financially, most syndicate houses simply could not afford to do it.8s
Furthermore, increasing the gross profit to each underwriter from
the offering so that all participants could make the necessary
investigation would make the cost of public financing prohibitive.
Small conscientious houses could never finance the BarChris
investigation they knew was required, and underwriting could fall
n283 F. Supp. at 697. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
"Protection is afforded the investor in the form of multiple defendants. However, it is clear
that the goal of section I I is to create conduct in public offering participants that will result
in such good disclosure that the investor would be kept out of the courts. Compensation to
the investor is a secondary objective of the Securities Act. See Shulman, supra note 14, at
253. Therefore, when Judge McLean considered the reasonableness of the conduct of the lead
underwriter, utilizing only the representations of the company's management to satisfy due
diligence, the touchstone was the disclosure scheme. The phrase "reasonable investigation"
had to be read to effectuate the statute's purpose of protection of the inviestor. If the conduct
employed is such that no additional protection is afforded, then the syndicate underwriters'
participation in the enterprise is without value. 283 F. Supp. at 697.
An argument might be made that additional protection is afforded to the investor by
allowing syndicate underwriters to delegate to the lead underwriter, since delegation by all to
one would mean more financial resources available to make a single, very detailed
investigation. While this in actuality may be the case, theoretically, there should be no
difference in the lead underwriter's investigation whether he is acting solely for himself or for
all the underwriters. The same investigatory due care is required of the managing underwriter
in either
capacity.
8
1See Douglas & Bates, supra note 33, at 290-9 1; Douglas & Bates, supra note 9, at 200-02.
82 [l]f the underwriter's participation were no more than $10,000 to $100,000 with a
gross spread of from $300 to $4000, out of which he would have to cover his overhead,
pay direct expenses and commission, set aside a reserve for unsuccessful underwritings,
derive a profit, and in addition finance an investigation similar to that which might be
undertaken by the originating house, it is obvious that he would not participate.
Douglas & Bates, supra note 9, at 202 n. 169.
Uld.
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into financially irresponsible hands, likely at the expense of the
"truth in securities" sought to be promoted." Another possibility
might be that underwriting would become concentrated in only the
larger houses that could finance the investigation, by underwriting a
major portion of an offering to increase gross profit. However, the
protection against being bankrupted by the failure of a single
offering provided by the syndicate method of underwriting, through
division of risk and liability, would be lost."'
Therefore, the reasonableness of a practice by participating
underwriters to delegate some investigatory burdens seems apparent
just from the difficulties that would be created by a prohibition of
delegation. Moreover, the ability to delegate is supported by the
Conference Report of the Securities Act of 1933 which stated that

under certain circumstances, delegation to others could be a "full
discharge" of responsibilities under the statute.86 Indeed, this
practice of delegation would seem analogous to and supported by the
common but unquestioned practice of the lead underwriter of relying
on its counsel for performance of certain non-expertise activities."
How Much Can Syndicate Underwriters Delegate? If syndicate
underwriters are permitted to discharge investigatory obligations by
delegation to the lead underwriter, how much of their due care

requirement can they fulfill by such delegation? Since most acts can
'"One result might be that security distribution would fall into the hands of financially
irresponsible houses. This would not only be directly inimical to the interests of investors, but
would place all the real burden of underwriting back upon the issuer." Id. See note 54 supra.
"See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text. The syndicate system, by allowing each
underwriter to take a small percentage of an offering, rather than forcing him to commit a
large amount or his capital to one issue, offers the advantage that the underwriter would not
become insolvent as the result of one offering failure and would, therefore, not be judgment
proof. Likewise, the liability distribution among many houses, attendant to the syndicate
system, means more available assets if investor injury and litigation should develop.
, Section I I does not . . . necessitate that the individual perform every duty imposed
upon him. Delegation to others of the performance of acts which it is unreasonable to
require that the fiduciary shall personally perform is permissible. Especially is this true
where the character of the acts involves professional skill or facilities not possessed by
the fiduciary himself. In such cases, reliance by the fiduciary, if his reliance is
reasonable in the light of all the circumstances, is a full discharge of his responsibilities.
H.R. REP. No. 152. 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 26 (1933). .
See 3 Loss 1726; Halleran a Calderwood, supra note 50, at 99; Landis, supra note 59, at
332.
"The lead underwriter in BarChris delegated the major part of the investigation to the
underwriters' counsel. Judge McLean took no exception with the delegation as such. See 283
F. Supp. at 692, 697.
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usually be perfor'med through an agent, the initial response would
seem to be that total delegation would be permissible. However, the

trust-like obligation imposed on section 11(a) parties by section
I1(c), arguably puts limitations on the extent of delegation. 8

Similarly, the legislative history of the Securities Act manifests a
congressional intention that delegation of some acts would be
reasonable where those acts9 might, because of specialization, be
89
better performed by another.
The extent to which delegation is permissible likely lies in an
interpretation and application of the "prudent man" rule of section

I I(c) to participating underwriters. Three factors are immediately
presented in determining when a prudent man would delegate an

obligation rather than personally perform it. First, delegation would
likely occur when the delegate can better discharge the obligation,

perhaps through expertise or experience or through concentration of
economic resources.10 This factor would lend some support to the
"Normally, delegation to and performance by an agent is unobjectionable. However, in the
securities context, as in other fiduciary duty situations, this rule is not fully applicable.
Limitations on delegation to a deputy seem apparent in the trust-like duty of care placed on
the underwriter. See note 23 %upraand accompanying text. A trustee may delegate those duties
which are ministerial in nature. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1959). It is
clear, however, that making an investigation of the issuer is more than ministerial. Given the
variety of possible fact situations presented by each issuer, experience, knowledge. and
judgment are all key factors. See text accompanying notes 46-47 supra. A trustee may also
delegate those duties which he cannot reasonably be asked to personally perform. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1959). And, it is this rule which Congress
apparently intended to adopt. See notes 21 & 69 supra and accompanying text.
Beyond this right to delegate those acts which the underwriter cannot reasonably be asked
to personally perform, there is no evidence of additional congressional intention or definition.
James M. Landis, co-author of the Securities Act, and later head of the FTC and SEC said
that this general language of the Conference Report was to "indicate that a goodly measure
of delegation was justifiable .... " See Landis, The Legislative History of the Securitdie let
of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 29, 48 (1959). However, it appears that the prime
beneficiaries of the report language were thought to be corporate directors. No mention was
made of its application to participating underwriters. Id.
The important point is, then, that there is no specific support for the underwriting group's
total delegation, other than the very general language of the Conference Report. Moreover,
the admitted objective of the delegation language, to aid corporate directors, seems impliedly
repudiated by BarChris. See 283 F. Supp. at 688-89. Given these factors, as well as the
possibility that Congress might very well have thought that forcing some underwriter
investigatory duplication would increase the quality of disclosure, the more reasonable
conclusion is that the Conference Report, and therefore congressional intention, is silent on
the syndicate practice of total delegation and reliance on the managing underwriter to satisfy
investigatory due care.
"See note 86 supra.
"Through economies of scale the managing underwriter might likely be able to perform the
BarChris investigation more cheaply than others in the group. When combined with the
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delegation of almost any investigatory duty of the participating
underwriter to the likely more able managing house. Second,
delegation seems reasonable where the delegator cannot fully
discharge the obligation on his own. This factor would, arguably,
support delegation of most of the more expensive, tedious functions
of the underwriter's investigation to the managing house which
9
participating underwriters might not be able to adequately finance. '
Finally, delegation would likely be acceptable where risk of
consequences from negligent performance by the delegate seems
small. Thus, delegation where the issue is low risk and the issuer is
92
well established would apparently be supported by this factor.
Yet, such an analysis is not without difficulties. For instance,
managing underwriter expertise and economies of scale will almost
always support total delegation, especially if the right to delegate
includes the requirement of delegation to a responsible individual.
Or, if delegation is related to size of spread or profit, participating
underwriters might not unreasonably be expected to curb percentage
participation in the offering accordingly. And finally, utilizing both
the facts surrounding the individual underwriters as well as data
accompanying the issue and issuer will likely create a great deal of
uncertainty among participating underwriters as to just what they
might properly delegate.
The resolution would, therefore, rest on the determination of
whether any marginal increase in disclosure to be had by requiring
duplication of effort rather than delegation would be justified in light
of the uncertainty that would be created. Indeed, since duplication
of effort by the participating underwriter rather than concentration
of economic resources in the lead house, arguably could mean a
decline in the depth or extent of the managing underwriter's
investigation,' 3 the better view would seem to be to permit total
managing fee from the other underwriters, the lead house should be able to make an even more
high-powered, in depth effort.
"See notes 81-82 vupra and accompanying text.
"Arguably. delegation where the issuer is a higher risk outfit should also be permitted since
this situation would seem to require most critically the expertise or an experienced lead
underwriter.
'"Assuming the total spread is set between the issuer and underwriters, the underwriting
group will have a fixed amount of money with which to work. To the extent that participating
underwriters are required to make independent, duplicative efforts, money available to the lead
underwriter through the management fee for his investigation will be reduced. This margin
could be restored by increasing the size of the total underwriting gross profit. However, since
the increase is financing only duplicative efforts, additional disclosure seems unlikely. Thus.
the increase in the spread becomes a needless cost on capital.
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delegation by participating underwriters of all section II (b)(3)
investigatory duties.
The Delegation Itselfas a Dischargeof Due Diligence Obligations
Delegation Plus Reliance Alone Would Never Be a Total
Dischargeof Investigatory Due Care. This proposition suggsts that
if syndicate underwriters choose delegation to and reliance on
another they must continue to remain responsible and engage in
additional affirmative conduct. 9' What that additional conduct
might be would be a question of fact based on the circumstances
presented by the particular issue and issuer as well as by the course
of preparation of the offering by the main underwriter. The
financial ability of the syndicate members based on gross profit to
be realized from the offering might also be a factor."
However, two problems are raised by this proposition. Syndicate
underwriters would almost necessarily be put in a position of
uncertainty as to what additional conduct would be required and in
some cases might feel compelled to engage in needless, duplicatory
conduct which would likely return little in additional disclosure.
Also, there exists the possibility of the somewhat anomalous situation where only part of the underwriting group is liable to injured
investors since the lead and certain participating underwriters might
satisfy due diligence while others would not." Thus, if courts choose
a standard which would require additional, non-delegable conduct,
they should require that the activity be directed to watchdogging the
lead underwriter rather than the issuer since such conduct would
UA requirement of additional conduct by participating underwriters might be inferred from
the following statement by former SEC Chairman Manuel Cohen:
Quite obviously the principal underwriter acts for all the others. If all of the
underwriters deputize someone to carry out for them their responsibility although they
continue to remain responsible, to that extent, nevertheless they may look to the
activities undertaken by the principal underwriter by way of defense for their own
action or inaction. I must emphasize that in this respect the principal underwriter is
acting only as a deputy and his investigations and other actions may or may not
provide a defense.mpo.ium. supra note 21, at 43-44.

"5 The Conference Report accompanying the Securities Act suggests that additional activity
in certain circumstances might be required: "IRleliance by the fiduciary, if his reliance fs
reasonable in the light of all circumstances, is a full discharge of his responsibilities." H.R.
ReP. No. 152, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 26 (1933) (emphasis added).
"If the financial ability of each participating underwriter to perform certain additional
activities were considered in deciding what additional activity would be required, a multitude
of standards could result with a different standard possible for each house.
7See note 72 vupra and accompanying text.
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more likely yield additional disclosure and avoid the possibility of

some underwriters escaping liability while others would not. 8
Delegation to a Responsible Person Plus Reliance Would Be a
Discharge of Investigatory Due Care. Under this alternative, the

participating underwriters could delegate entirely all investigatory,
obligations they had under section ll(b)(3) to the managing

underwriter. A further requirement, in order to advance the
preventive objectives of the Securities Act, would be to require

delegation to a "responsible" party." "Responsibleness" might be
based on the extent of the lead underwriter's percentage participation
in the offering and, more importantly, on his general business
reputation. As in the previous standard, the participating
underwriters would stand or fall according to the sufficiency of the
investigation conducted by the managing underwriter. 00 One
apparent drawback would be that no additional conduct is required
"A collateral point to the determination of the affirmative conduct necessary for syndicate
due care is the consideration of the present community practice of "due diligence meetings."
These meetings are held several times during the preparation of the offering and are considered
by participating underwriters as satisfying, in part, any requirement of affirmative conduct
placed on them by section I I (b)(3). Ideally, all corporate officers, and representatives of the
underwriters and their counsel and accountants, meet to critically analyze the prospectus,
correct deficiencies in the registration statement, and generally scrutinize any and all
representations of management, utilizing natural skepticism in combination with the "give and
take" of a question and answer approach to disclose areas of weakness.
The question is: Does the due diligence meeting contribute in any way to "reasonableness,"
such that syndicate underwriters might rely on it, to some extent, to establish due care? If
the meeting is to be a part of investigatory due diligence, a future court could apply the
requirements of BarChris and require that the activity or conduct in a due diligence meeting
be of a type that will advance the disclosure aims of the Securities Act. This could best be
done by making the meeting a thorough, adversary-oriented meeting in which syndicate
members send prepared, competent securities analysts. Several meetings could be held during
the preparation period, or one, high-powered meeting might be had, a day or two before the
registration statement became effective. However, since syndicate underwriters are seeking to
rely on the managing underwriter's investigation, the focus of these meetings should be on the
work done by the lead underwriter in order to avoid misstatement or omission of material
facts rather than on the representations of management as in the past. See generally 3 Loss
1730-31; Brown, The Due Diligence Meeting-Challenge and Opportunity 63 PUB. UTIL.
FORT. 477 (1959); Israels, Preparation of Registration Statenent-lssuers Counsel-Advice
to MY Client, 24 Bus. LAw. 537, 542-43 (1969); Symposium. supra note 21, at 42-43.
"The requirement of delegation to a "responsible" party would seem inherent in the
Conference Report statement that reliance must be reasonable. See note 86 supra.
"'The agreement among the underwriters might conceivably have an indemnification
provision requiring the managing underwriter to reimburse syndicate members for any liability
they incur as the result of the managing underwriter's lack of due care. See note 211 hifra
for a discussion of the enforceability of such a provision.
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of the syndicate members. Yet, since syndicate houses will naturally
benefit through a sufficient investigation by the lead underwriter, a

substantial incentive to watch over the managing underwriter would
seem to exist.' 0' Moreover, the ease of application of the standard,

as well as the minimal uncertainty and duplicative activity likely,
makes this rule of participating underwriter due diligence-the best
choice.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF

1933

The Underwriterand Section 17(a)

Section II has not been the only area of underwriter liability
undergoing examination and change. In Globus v. Law Research

Service, Inc. ,02 a new area of underwriter liability, punitive damages,
was considered under section 17(a) of the Securities Act. 03 Section
17(a) of the Securities Act prohibits in the offer or sale of securities
through interstate commerce the employment of any fraudulent

scheme, the misrepresentation or omission of any material fact, or
the engagement in any practice that would deceive the purchaser.''
The section thus utilizes essentially the same language as rule lOb5105 promulgated under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934,106 with the exception that section 17(a) applies only to the

offer or sale of securities, and is, therefore, solely a buyer's
remedy. 0 7 The provision has no civil liability language and was
'°'Although the activity would not be required. syndicate members might be expected to
engage in somewhat the same conduct as suggested in note 98 %upra.
102
F.2d
(2d Cir. 1969), revg 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. 1 92,474 (Sept. 9, 1969)).
"'Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a). 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964).
'"Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce
or by the use of the mail. directly or indirectly (I) to employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud, or. (2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made. in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or (3) to engage in any transaction. practice. or course ol
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964).
'17C.F.R.§ 240.10b-5 (1969).
'- 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
"Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 have been applied by the courts to both purchases and sales
of securities. Thus. these provisions are available to the injured seller a.% well as buyer. %1,,
i-.2d at
n. I
For a comparison or section 17 ol the Securities Act and section 10(b) ol the Securities
Exchange Act. ,c, wtwrallt 3 Loss 1423-25. 1428: Cohen. %uJ'ranote 8. at 1364-65
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apparently never intended as a vehicle for private compensatory

recovery.105 Courts, nevertheless, have implied a civil liability for any
injury caused to the securities purchaser by the use of fraudulent and
deceptive practices which the section outlaws. 109 In implying this

securities law fraud remedy, courts have established a standard of
misconduct for liability short of the elements of common law fraud,

lessening the sometimes difficult burdens of proof surrounding the
concepts of scienter, justifiable reliance, and privity

10

However,

punitive recovery under section 17(a) has never been sanctioned by
the courts."'
'S.e Landis. %uipranote 59, at 33 1.
'I'Dack v. Shanman, 227 F. Supp. 26. 28-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); wee3 Loss 1784-91. Section
10(b) civil liability was also judicially implied. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp.
512 (E.D.Pa. 1946).
The implying of civil liability under section 17 has been criticized as encouraging the
investor to ignore the detailed scheme formulated by Congress in the express liability sections.
1;,e 3 Loss 1784-86: c l 6 Loss 3912; Loss. Tihe Opinion. 24 Bus. LAw. 523, 527 (1969). Thus
in (;lobtt.
plaintiff stated a claim against underwriter Blair & Co. which Congress dealt with
and gave a remedy for in section 12(2) of the Securities Act. Nevertheless, plaintiff was also
able to state a claim under section 17(a) and, at least at the district court level, avoid the
specific measure of relief provided by section 12(2). See note 140 intra.
"Vee 3 Loss 1430-44; Shulman. virprIt note 14. at 248. Copare Professor Loss's statement
of the "elements" of common law deceit: "There must be (1)a false representation of (2) a
material (3) fact: (4) the defendant must know of the falsity (scienter) nut ma e the 'tat,ntent
ite'rertihh'Ic
hr the purpose ol'ithicing the plitintill to reIr on it: and (5) the plaintiff must
jiwtiliah"r rel on it and (6) suffer damage as a consequence." 3 Loss 1431 (emphasis added)
with district court Judge Mansfield's recitation of securities law fraud in Glob,,.: "'IThe
defendants made (I) false or misleading statements (2) with respect to material facts (3) with
knowledge that the statements were false or misleading, or of the existence of facts which, if
disclosed, would reveal them to be false or misleading, and that (4) the plaintiffs relied upon
the statements as substantial factors in determining their course of conduct (as distinguished
from 'justifiable reliance') (5) with resulting damage." 287 1-. Supp. at 194.
Judge Mansfield then suggested that securities law fraud differs from common law deceit
in two respects. Whereas the former requires only that the statement be made with knowledge
of its falsity, the latter necessitates this plus an intent to make the statement for the purpose
of inducing the plaintiff to rely on it. /i. at 198. But %ev3 Loss 1432. 1440-42 for the disparity
of views that have been taken as to the scienter requirement. The second differentiation
between the two types of fraud is the degree of reliance necessary. Securities law fraud requires
only "actual reliance," while common law deceit demands "justifiable reliance." Although it
is not clear, it appears that plaintiffs failed to establish common law fraud in Globus because
they could not demonstrate the requisite reliance. 287 F. Supp. at 193.
For a short discussion of some of the other advantages of section 17(a) as a civil remedy,
see Painter, Civil Liabilities arnd Administrative Sanctions Under the Sectrrities Act of 1933.
34 U. Mo. K.C.L. REV. 185, 192 (1966).
" Punitive damages have never actually been awarded for a violation of the Securities Act
of 1933. In Nagel v. Prescott & Co., 36 F.R.D. 445 (N.D. Ohio 1964), an action under section
12(2) of the Securities Act, a federal district court denied defendants' objections to plaintiffs'
interrogatories relating to a possible punitive damages claim, thereby implying that such
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Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc.-A Decision That Punitive
Damages Were Not Authorized in an Action Under Section 17/a)
of the Securities Act

Law Research Service, Inc., is a computerized law information
retrieval service. In need of capital to offset expenses for
programming and other related services, Law Research, through its
underwriter Blair & Co., made a Regulation A offering of its
stock." 2 The accompanying offering circular, however,
misrepresented several material facts," 3 and when the information
was later released, the stock value dropped. In the ensuing action by
13 purchasers of the offering,"' the jury, while finding no common
damages were available under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. The .Vagel court held that baseil
on section 16 of the Securities Act. 15 U.S.C. § 7 7 p (1964). which saved all remedies that
existed prior to the Act, plaintiffs' punitive damage claim was preserved. See note 155 I/ilia
for the text of section 16. However, the court in its brief consideration of the issue ignored
certain express provisions of section 12(2). see note 140 infra, and failed to establish a standard
of misconduct necessary to support a claim for exemplary damages under the Act.
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, however, at least one district court has awarded
punitive damages. See de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 302 F. Supp. 647 (D. Colo. 1969).
Another court has apparently recognized the ability to recover an exemplary award. See Hecht
v. Harris. Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit in Green v. Wolf Corp.. 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). disapproved of this view by finding that punitive damages were
not authorized by the Exchange Act. Id. at 303-04. See notes 144-47 ila and accompanying
text.
"'The offering was of 100.000 shares of common stock or Law Research at $3 a share.
F.2d at
. Regulation A, promulgated under section 3(b) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(b) (1964). authorizes the SEC to give exemptions from registration for offerings of
$300,000 or less. However, though the issuer is excused from filing the lengthy registration
statement and prospectus, he is still required to submit an offering circular. For a discussion
of the offering circular requirement, as well as a description of the information to be included
in the circular, see I Loss 621-25. After review by a Regional Office of the SEC, the circular
is distributed to prospective purchasers of the issue.
"'In June of 1963. Law Research had entered into an exclusive five-year contract with the
Univac Division of Sperry Rand for programming and other important services. These
services were essential to the successful operation of the Law Research enterprise. The offering
circular distributed by Law Research and underwriter Blair & Co. made prominent reference
to the Sperry Rand contract. However, the circular misrepresented the relations between Law
Research and Sperry Rand by omitting mention of three material facts: (I) That Sperry Rand
had terminated the contract for nonpayment of certain accumulated debts of Law Research
owed to Sperry Rand; (2) that Sperry Rand had refused to perform certain vital services
pursuant to the contract: and (3) that Law Research had instituted a lawsuit against Sperry
Rand for breach of contract, fraud, and specific performance, which was pending at the time
of the circular. 287 F. Supp. at 191-92. The circuit court found that there was adequate
evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that the omissions were of material
facts and that they caused the offering circular to be misleading.
F.2d at
" [T]he complaint charged Ellias C. Hoppenfeld, [Law Research] President. and Blair
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law fraud against defendant Law Research and underwriter Blair,
returned verdicts for plaintiffs on their claims for securities law fraud
and awarded compensatory and punitive damages, finding
underwriter Blair & Co. guilty of "actual knowledge" of the

misrepresentations made in the offering circular."' The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, reversed the exemplary
award, finding that such an award was not authorized by the
Securities Act of 1933.116
The Globus Rationale: District Court Level."7 In sanctioning the

punitive damages award under section 17(a) in Globus, district court
Judge Mansfield first determined that such damages were not

prohibited by the Securities Act. The 1933 Act contained no express
proscription of exemplary damages as did the 1934 Act, and there
was no implied prohibition to be drawn either from the federal
statutory origin of the liability or from the proscription in the
Exchange Act. The Globus court reasoned that since the federal law

basis of the liability did not require express legislative authorization
of exemplary damages," 8 congressional silence did not imply that
such recovery was proscribed." 9 Likewise, the proscription of
punitive damages in the Exchange Act 20 was not to be read into the
& Co., Granberry. Marache Inc., the underwriter of the issue, in three counts with

violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and common law fraud, and Blair & Co. in two counts with violation of
§ 12(2) of the 1933 Act, and § 15(c) of the 1934 Exchange Act. 287 F. Supp. at 191.
The suit in Globus was begun as a class action. Later, a determination was made that the
action was not properly maintainable as a class suit, from which there was no appeal.
F.2d at
n.8.
"5287 F. Supp. at 191. No punitive damages were awarded by the jury against the corporate
issuer, "apparently for fear that plaintiff might gain at the expense of other stockholdervictims who neglected to pursue their claims." Id. at 197.
11
F.2d at
"Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). re'rd.
F.2d
(2d Cir. 1969).
"'See. ,.g.. Mansell v. Saunders. 372 F.2d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 1967); Basista v. Weir. 340
F.2d 74, 84-88 (3d Cir. 1965).
"'287 F. Supp. at 194.
e'Section 28(a) or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits any person entitled to
maintain an action under the Act from recovering 'in excess of his actual damages." 15
U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964). In Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 977 (1969), this section was applied to the implied cause of action under section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act to prohibit punitive recovery. This was also the position of
several district courts. See. e.g.,
Pappas v. Moss, 257 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1966). rev'd on
other grounds. 393 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1968); Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 216 F. Supp.
469 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The Securities Act of 1933 has no provision like section 28(a). But see
note 125 tnlra.
Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act. however, cannot squarely be said to be an express
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Securities Act since the Exchange Act limitation was designed to
2
avoid a problem peculiar to the 1934 Act. '
Given the determination that exemplary damages were not

prohibited under the Securities Act, Judge Mansfield then decided
that an award of such damages was authorized under the statute
where the defendant's misconduct warranted it, since punitive relief
would advance the primary objectives of federal securities legislation
to induce full disclosure through fear of prospective liability. 2 He

reasoned that the supplemental liability of punitive damages could
be expected to promote truthfulness and that the additional

monetary reward should encourage the small investor to pursue his
claim in court, even though his out-of-pocket loss might not justify
the cost of a suit.'2
The Globus Rationale: Circuit Court Level. 2 1 In reversing the
proscription of punitive damages. Although the legislative history is unclear, the section
apparently was intended to prevent double compensatory recovery. See 3 Loss 1474 n.105.
Also. even if the limitation would preclude punitive recovery in an express private action under
the Exchange Act, some courts have not applied it to actions implied under rule lob-5. See.
e.g.. de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 302 F. Supp. 647,649 (D. Colo. 1969); Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 283 I-. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (dictum). See note 151 inlra and
accompanying text.
2 [I]nadopting the 1934 Exchange Act [Congress] was faced with a unique problem
not encountered in the earlier law. Since the 1934 Exchange Act was to apply only to
post-distribution trading of securities listed on national exchanges, issuers could avoid
its provisions, at least as far as new issues were concerned, simply by not listing them
on such exchanges. In order to avoid such a 'strike" Congress imposed less
burdensome requirements and standards in the 1934 Exchange Act upon issuers than
those found in §§ 11-12 of the 1933 Act, which could not easily be avoided by issuers.
since the 1933 Act dealt with the distribution of securities. whether or not listed on an
exchange, through use of the mails, telephone or any interstate instrumentality or
facility. The selective and limited applicability of § 28(a) of the 1934 Exchange Act
was part and parcel of this legislative design. 287 F. Supp. at 193-94.
Note, however, that the committee report accompanying the 1934 Act yields no explanation
for the section 28(a) limitation of the measure of damages under the Exchange Act. See H.R.
Ra:p. No. 1383. 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1934).
'2287 F. Supp. at 194-95.
12id. at 195. In deciding what standard of misconduct would warrant exemplary damages.
the Globus district court rejected a standard built on common law fraud principles, feeling
such a standard to be too narrow in the face of the broad purpose of punitive damages to
punish and deter both intentional and wanton and reckless anti-social conduct. A standard of
common law fraud would have effectively read punitive damages out of section 17(a) of the
Securities Act, since the claimant would likely have access to punitive recovery under a claim
for common law fraud. But see notes 162-64 infra and accompanying text.
Judge Mansfield indicated that the degree of misconduct by a defendant necessary to
support a punitive award was to be determined by local law. For an examination of this
standard, see 82 HARV. L. Ri-v 951.955-56 (1969); 44 N.Y U.L R v. 226, 234 (1969).
2
1'
Globus v. Law Research Serv.. Inc..
F.2d
(2d Cir. 1969).
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district court decision, the Second Circuit relied on an analysis of
the role that punitive recovery would play in the scheme of

enforcement of the Securities Act, eschewing approaches based
solely on either the legislative history of the 1933 Act or comparison

of that Act with the Securities Exchange Act which had been held
not to authorize punitive relief.ls 5 Although acknowledging that
punitive damages would deter and punish non-compliance with

section 17(a) of the statute, the court saw existing non-punitive
remedies as "an extensive 'arsenal of weapons'" to provide the
forces of retribution and deterrence.1 26 Moreover, the private action
implied under section 17(a), when cast in the increasingly attractive
form of a class action, was a sufficient concentration of litigative
power to constitute a "considerable deterrence clout" and encourage
12 7
investor action where individual injury was relatively small.
"'At least four related arguments in addition to the rationale of the circuit court in Globus
can be made for the proposition that punitive damages are not authorized by the Securities
Act in private actions under section 17(a): (I) While Congress likely never considered the issue
of punitive recovery under the Securities Act, both the express liability provisions of the Act,
see note 140 inlra. and the legislative history of the statute, see H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong.,
Ist Sess. 9 (1933). establish that Congress did contemplate a non-punitive measure of recovery
under the 1933 Act. Although the more difficult standard of proof under section 17(a) might
undermine a contention that the bounds of recovery under the express liability provisions of
the 1933 Act ought to be superimposed onto section 17(a), there is. a clear indication that
Congress did not intend the Securities Act of 1933 to be a vehicle for recovery grossly
disproportionate to the actual harm done. Cf Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 303 (2d
Cir. 1968). cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); (2) Cases considering the assignability of rights
of action under the Securities Act have field those rights to be "remedial" and not "penal."
Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp., 223 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Identical holdings under
the Securities Exchange Act served as a substantial part of the rationale for the holding of
proscription of punitive recovery under that act. See Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 216
F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); (3) Since a section 17(a) claim under the Securities Act is a
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 claim under the Securities Exchange Act, see
F.2d at
,a
claimant suing under section 17(a), therefore, states a claim under the 1934 Act and is limited
by section 28(a) of that act to compensatory damages. But see notes 165-72 infra and
accompanying text; (4) A dichotomy of remedies would exist under the 1933 and 1934 acts if
the former were held to authorize punitive recovery under section 17(a) of that statute, because
defrauded securities sellers, not covered under the 1933 Act, see note 107 supra and
accompanying text, would be limited to compensatory recovery under the 1934 Act. This
dichotomy would seem directly in conflict with the in pari nateria relationship of the two acts.
C/ Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. 766, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 6 Loss 3915
(Supp. 1969).
"'The Globus court outlines the substantive, procedural, and extra-statutory sanctions on
conduct in violation of section 17(a) of the Securities Act.
F.2d at
The concept of extra-statutory sanction would appear particularly significant in the total
deterrent force acting against underwriter misconduct. Since investment banker reputation is
important to both the prospective issuer and investor. the underwriter has substantial nonstatutory reasons to comply with the securities laws.
W Id. at
The class action has become extremely important in litigation under the
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Against these considerations which made any deterrent effect of
punitive recovery somewhat marginal, the court foresaw several
potentially adverse repercussions of exemplary damages. Since
multiple claims would generally be the rule rather than the exception
in a section 17(a) action where there was a misleading prospectus or
offering circular, exemplary recovery could bankrupt, for one
mistake, an otherwise honest issuer or underwriter. Similarly, with
little ability to anticipate the number of actions that might follow a
violation of the Act, no reasonable or fair method to restrict the
punitive award existed. Allowing early punitive recovery to exhaust
all demands for exemplary damages would hardly seem an equitable
approach.12 In addition to the limitation problem, allowing punitive
damages under the Securities Act would create "an unfortunate
dichotomy" in remedies available under that act and the Exchange
Act in situations of equally heinous misconduct. Since relief for a
defrauded seller was not available under section 17(a) of the 1933
Act,129 such a defrauded seller could bring an action under only the
1934 Act which did not permit exemplary recovery. '3 0 Thus,
reasoned the circuit court in Globus, the small amount of deterrence
to be realized from any punitive recovery under section 17(a) of the
Securities Act was outweighed by the unnecessary difficulties such a
3
recovery would create.' 1
Analysis of the Globus Opinions. The apparent purpose of
punitive damages in the Securities Act would be to deter and punish
federal securities law. Recent developments have expanded its availability. See Green v. Wolf
Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 677 (1969); Weiss v. Tenney Corp.,
47 F.R.D. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See also 6 Loss 3938-69 (Supp. 1969); Bernfeld, Class
Actins and Federal Securities L.aws. 55 CORNI..I. L. RI"V. 78 (1969): Note, Class .Action
Treatment of Securities Fraud Suits Under the Reviwd Rule 23. 36 GQ:o. WAsh. L. Rtv. 1150
(1968).
"In its discussion of the size of the punitive award, the Glohus court relied heavily on
Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967). That case placed emphasis
on the proposition that punitive recovery was more often than not awarded in torts involving
a single victim, where punitive recovery by him ended the matter. Id. at 838. In Roginskr.
plaintiff had recovered S 100,000 in punitive damages against a drug manufacturer for personal
injuries received as the result of his use of one of the manufacturer's drugs. Roginsky's suit
was the first of about 75 similar cases that were pending in the same district court. Several
hundred actions had apparently been filed elsewhere. ld. at 834. The circuit court in Roginsk',
in reversing the trial court's judgment on the punitive claim, stated: "We have the gravest
difficulty in perceiving how claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of actions
throughout the nation can be so administered as to avoid overkill." Id. at 839.
InSee notes 107 & 125 supra and accompanying text.
":Seenote 120 supra and accompanying text.
"'
F.2d at
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violations of the statute.132 Also, as the district court suggested, an

additional function might be to encourage civil action where the
small size of the injury would not, alone, justify the cost of a private

suit.lu The district and circuit courts took different views as to the
performance of these functions. The point of distinction between the
two courts seems to lie in their different views of the role punitive

damages would play and, therefore, the degree of justification
necessary to establish the device. The district court apparently
viewed punitive relief as being "supplementary" to existing

remedies. Thus, since the possibility of punitive damages would
almost necessarily have to deter fraud in the sale of securities and

since they were not expressly prohibited by the Act,'

the district

court viewed the remedy as in accord with the objectives of the

statute and, therefore, justified.lu The court gave no consideration
to the sufficiency of existing devices and remedies under the Act

because the "supplemental" nature of the damages required no
showing of necessity. The circuit court, however, approached the

question quite differently. To that court, "[tihe seminal question
[was] whether punitive damage recovery [was] necessary for the
effective enforcement of the Act." '

Its inquiry, therefore, required

a showing of need and thus allowed the court to consider existing
liability and procedural tools under the Securities Act. 137 Although

not attested to by any empirical data, the court found the nonpunitive rights and remedies sufficient to yield compliance with the
Act.Iu
'" Cf. 287 F. Supp. at 194-95.
'" Id. at 195.

IuSee note 120 supra and accompanying text.
'"287 F. Supp. at 194-95.
iu
F.2d at
'"See notes 126-27 supra and accompanying text. The Second Circuit took the same
approach in Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied. 395 U.S.
677 (1969), when it found punitive damages not to be authorized under the Securities
Exchange Act. In Green the court said: 'We have gone far beyond the limits of the common
law in imposing liability under lob-5 and thus may not import all the other aspects of
common law fraud without scrutiny." Id. at 303.
'There are some difficulties in the position taken by the circuit court in Globus, primarily
in its discussion of the "potentially awesome injuries that [punitive] damages may impose."
Here, the court's primary worry seems to be the Roginsky situation-multiple plaintiffs each
exacting a measure of punitive recovery which when aggravated would result in bankruptcy
to the underwriter or issuer. See note 128 supra. Yet, for several reasons, the Roginsky
situation is not completely analogous. First, while the class action would hardly seem available
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The holding in Globus. though limited to a claim for punitive
damages under section 17(a), also clearly precludes recovery of

"smart money" under either section 11 or section 12, the express
liability provisions of the Securities Act.' Initially, both of those
sections have express measures of damages which arguably limit
recovery to non-punitive relief. 4 Indeed, the Globus circuit court
in the Roginsky personal injury situation, that device has apparently become an effective tool
for bringing together claimants in the securities fraud action. F'.2d at ; see Wright,
Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 179 (1969); note 127 supra. Thus, to the extent that claimants
are brought together in one action, the problem of multiple suits is obviously diminished. To
be sure, however, a claimant can opt out of the class action, thus meaning that the problem
of individual action is not completely erased. Indeed, such a move might be encouraged,
if the claimant thought his chances for a greater punitive recovery were better in the
individual action. However, opting out of the class action will mean certain disadvantages
to the individual claimant, see Wright, supra, at 181. Second, federal control over the totality
of litigation arising from a violation of the Securities Exchange Act is much different than
the Roginsky situation where the court is applying state law. Section 27 of the Exchange Act
provides that federal district courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction for claims arising under
the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964). See 3 Loss 2005. Thus, whenever a plaintiff stated a
claim which was also a cause under the 1934 Act the ability of federal courts to control
punitive recovery would seem to be greater than in Roginskr. Third, the nature or amount of
compensatory damages likely to be awarded in a 1934 Act rule lOb-5 action might frequently
differ from the Roginski, recovery. Whereas juries in the personal injury situation may tend
to put a punitive element in the compensatory award, this seems less likely in the securities
law fraud suit where the computation of compensatory damages might be nothing more than
a mechanical operation. See generally Comment, Measurement of Damages in Private Actions
Under Rule lOb-5, 1968 WAsH. U.L.Q. 164. Moreover, .the Roginsky court suggested that
more of a punitive element might appear in the compensatory award if exemplary damages
were eliminated. 378 F.2d at 841. Again this would seem unlikely in the rule lOb-5 action.
Finally, Roginsky did not remove the possibility of punitive recovery in all products liability
cases but rather only in the multiple, separate claims situation. Perhaps this should have been
the rule adopted by the Globus court. In the single claimant case, none of the ill effects of
punitive recovery would seem to exist. Yet, in the multiple claimant situation, the aggregate
compensatory recovery would likely be sufficient punishment and deterrence without punitive
recovery.
'115 U.S.C. §§ 77k-771 (1964).
'"Section 1-1
(e)in part provides:
The suit authorized under subsection (a) of this section may be to recover such damages
as shall represent the difference between the amount paid for the security (not exceeding
the price at which the security was offered to the public) and (i) the value thereof as
of the time such suit was brought, or (2) the price at which such security shall have
been disposed of in the market before suit, or (3) the price at which such security shall
have been disposed of after suit but before judgment if such damages shall be less than
the damages representing the difference between the amount paid for the security (not
exceeding the price at which the security was offered to the public) and the value thereof
as of the time such suit was brought. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964).
Section II(g) provides: "inno case shall the amount recoverable under this section exceed
the price at which the security was offered to the public." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(g) (1964).
Section 12 provides in part: "[T]he person purchasing such security

. . .

may sue

. . .

to
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implied such a limitation in its discussion of alternative grounds for

its decision in the section 17(a) situation.

1

Moreover, the policy

grounds utilized in Globus would seem equally applicable to section
11 and section 12(2) claims each of which would more likely than
142
not involve multiple claims.

Comparison with the Exchange Act Prohibition:Green v. Wolf

Corp.4 3 The result in Globus was in many respects predictable since
the Second Circuit a year earlier in Green v. Wolf Corp. had found

that punitive damages were not authorized in private actions under
the Securities Exchange Act.144 Green involved a purchaser suing in
a class action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 of the Exchange
Act to recover compensatory and punitive damages for untrue and
misleading statements in several prospectuses issued by defendant

Wolf Corporation. The court rejected plaintiff's request for reversal
of a district court order striking portions of the complaint relating
to punitive damages, expressly approving the position taken by
several district courts that section 28 of the Exchange Act limited
recovery in private actions under that act to "actual damages."'4 5
Such a position, the Green court reasoned, was consistent with the
likely congressional intention that the provisions of the Exchange

Act were not to be used as a vehicle for recovery "grossly
disproportionate to the harm done.'

46

Moreover, as the eourt

recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any
income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns
the security." 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1964). But see note I I Isupra.
"'The Globus circuit court said in considering limitation of recovery under section 17(a) of
the Securities Act: "[N]either Congressional mindreading nor stenciling the bounds of the
express liability sections onto § 17(a) provide a firm basis for decision."
F.2d at
'Section I I applies to the registered offering of securities. Section 12(2) governs inter alia
an issue through a Regulation A exemption and other similar offerings involving interstate
commerce or the mails. At least in these situations, multiple claims would be expected.
'4406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 677 (1969).
11d.at 303.
15td. at 302. The position that section 28 of the Securities Exchange Act limits recovery in
private suits under the Act was adopted by district courts in Pappas v. Moss, 257 F. Supp.
345 (D.N.J. 1966), revd on other grounds, 393 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1968) and Meisel v. North
Jersey Trust Co., 216 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See note 125 supra for an analysis of
the analogical force these cases might have in the Globus 1933 Act situation.
The Green court agreed with the "conclusions" of these district courts. It is assumed that
the "conclusions" mean not only that punitive damages are not authorized under the 1934
Act but that they are not authorized because of the applicability of the section 28 limitation.
'"406 F.2d at 303. The Green court also saw as significant the fact that when the Securities
Exchange Act was passed, it was not envisioned that the Act would be the basis for so many
private actions. td.
In considering the legislative intention on liability under the 1934 Act, the Green court made
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decided, the deterrent and retributive policies of exemplary recovery
were not realized by utilization of such recovery in an Exchange Act

private action. Existing non-punitive liability provided sufficient
deterrence and retribution for Exchange Act violations especially
when concentrated through procedural devices in the form of an
47
individual action.
Although the consistency of the results in Green and Globus
seems apparent, the harmony of the rationales employed in the two
cases is less certain. Globus represented a balancing of policy
considerations. 4 Green also contained policy considerations but was
apparently decided, in major part, on the alleged prohibition of
punitive relief by section 28 of the 1934 Act.' 4 9 Although the

Securities Act has no section 28 limitation as such,5 0 to account for
the difference of the rationales in Green and Globus on this basis
seems somewhat unsatisfactory for at least two reasons. First, the
conclusion apparently adopted by the Second Circuit that section 28
does in fact limit recovery under the implied private action of section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 is not completely persuasive and has not been
accepted by several other courts.'-' Second, even if section 28 does
an unfortunate attempt to distinguish the Globus district court decision allowing punitive
recovery under the 1933 Act by utilizing Judge Mansfield's rationale concerning problems
peculiar with the 1934 Act. Id. See note 121 supra and accompanying text. Yet by the time
the Green court was faced with the question of punitive damages, the logic behind the
differentiation of the acts was gone because Congress had in the 1964 amendments to the
Exchange Act expanded the scope of that act beyond corporations whose securities were
registered on the national exchanges. See generally Phillips & Shipman, An Analysis of the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 1964 DuxK L.J. 706. Indeed, since it was clear that
Congress had never specifically considered the question of punitive recovery under either of
the securities acts and how it would aid the in terrorem objectives of those acts, see notes 121
& 125 supra, the differentiation of the two acts certainly was not compelled and was, as it
turned out, apparently inaccurate. Note, however, that the Second Circuit spoke indirectly in
its opinion in Globus to this possible distinction intended between the acts when it
characterized the language in Green concerning the 1933 Act as "merely dicta intended to
limit the holdins, in Green to the specific issue then before the court."
F.2d at
n. 12.
114D6 F.2d at 303.
'"See notes 126-31 supra and accompanying text.
"'See notes 144-47 supra and accompanying text.
'" But see note 125 supra.
"'The argument that section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act does not limit recovery
in the implied private action under rule lob-5 was most recently stated in de Haas v. Empire
Petroleum Co., 302 F. Supp. 647 (D. Colo. 1969). In allowing the plaintiff to recover
exemplary damages against one of the defendants, the de Haas court relied heavily on
the general tort law basis of the rule 1Ob-5 cause first espoused in Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Section 28(a), the de Haas court reasoned,
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so limit the implied rights and remedies under the Exchange Act, the
argument that the Securities Act implicitly has a similar limitation
has not been satisfactorily considered.'5 The rationales of Green and
Globus would, therefore, seem inconsistent to a substantial degree.
Recovery of Punitive Damages Where PlaintiffProves a Violation
of the FederalSecurities Lawanda Pendent Claimfor Common
Law Fraud
The question remaining after Globus is whether a securities law
plaintiff is barred from recovery of punitive damages in a federal
court where the same operative facts form the basis for an action
under the securities acts.153 Under the Securities Act of 1933, there
would appear to be no prohibition of punitive recovery for common
law fraud, assuming plaintiff could establish his joined
compensatory and punitive claim under applicable local law. Globus
certainly would not prevent this exemplary recovery since it held
only that punitive damages were not authorized in private actions
based on section 17(a) of the Securities Act'-making no reference
to the situation where plaintiff's prayer for punitive relief was based
on a claim in common law fraud. Moreover, section 16 of the Act
expressly preserves "all other rights and remedies that may exist at
law or in equity. ' ' 15
was intended by Congress to limit those claims for relief which were expressly or impliedly
created by the Exchange Act. Thus, since the rule lOb-5 cause rested not on an express or
implied grant of authority in the Act but rather on principles of tort law, the cause was not
by the section 28(a) provision. Id. at 649.
limited
"12See note 125 supra. It seems clear that the Second Circuit wAs not abandoning its stand
on section 28(a) of the Exchange Act in Globus: "Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act prohibits
The position of the
F.2d at
punitive damages in actions brought under that Act."
Second Circuit on the application of section 28(a) to the implied cause of action is extremely
important to the determination of the question of whether punitive damages can be recovered
under any theory where a claim under the Securities Exchange Act exists. See notes 159-62
infra and accompanying text.
'"In Globus, besides never considering the question of punitive damages for a common law
fraud claim joined to a Securities Act claim, the court expressly disclaimed decision on the
question of whether section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act would preclude punitive
F.2d at
recovery in an action on common law fraud joined to an Exchange Act suit.
n. 11.
I
F.2d at
'"Section 16 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides: "The rights and remedies provided by
this subchapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist
77
at law or in equity." 15 U.S.C. § p (1964). But see note 162 infra.
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The problem, however, is not quite so simple in the Exchange
Act situation, where plaintiff is seeking punitive damages in an
action for common law fraud joined to a suit under section 10(b)
t Section 28 of the 1934 Act, like section 16 of the
and rule lOb-5.55
1933 Act, states that rights and remedies created by the Exchange
Act shalf be in addition to those that may exist at law or in equity.)"7
Thus, the common law fraud claim for compensatory and punitive
recovery would seem to be preserved. However, immediately after
the clause which preserves existing remedies, section 28 also
provides:
[B]ut no person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the
provisions of [the Exchange Act] shall recover, through satisfaction of

judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual
damages on account of the act complained of.'"

Green v. Wolf Corp. tells us that section 28(a) applies to an implied
private suit under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 to limit recovery to
actual damages. "' The determination of whether the section serves
to prevent punitive recovery under a joined claim based on a theory
of common law fraud would, therefore, seem to lie in an
interpretation of the language of section 28 (a).16
Initially, the structure of section 28(a) clearly indicates that
Congress did not intend the thrust of the section's limitation to be
merely at recovery in suits under the Act. By first declaring that all
existing remedies were preserved and then by placing a limitation on
total recovery, the intention of the section is apparently to regulate
the final aggregate recovery under all theories for the injury resulting
from the alleged wrongful act.' Literally read, then, section 28(a)
"'In the situation where the plaintiff had joined an Exchange Act claim with a cause of
action for common law fraud, his ability to have the latter claim adjudicated in a federal court
would rest on the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. See generally Lowenfels, Pendent
Jurisdiction and the Federal Securities Acts. 67 COLM. L. REv. 474 (1967).
'"Section 28(a) provides in part that:
The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any and all
other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no person permitted
to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this chipter shall recover,
through satisfaction of judgment through one or more actions, a total amount in excess
of his actual damages on account of the act complained of. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)

(1964).

1-15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964) (emphasis added).
"See notes 145-46 supra and accompanying text.
'"See note 157 supra for the text of section 28(a).
"I Besides the language of the section itself, the argument of Judge Mansfield, see note 121
supra, and the suggestion of Professor Loss, see note 120 supra, indirectly support the view
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would limit the total aggregate recovery under all theories in any

number of actions to a total not in excess of actual damages
whenever plaintiff was injured by conduct which would give rise to
an express or implied Exchange Act claim. It therefore seems
elementary that punitive recovery could not be had in a Securities

Exchange Act suit even under a joined claim based on common-law
62
fraud.1
This outcome apparently would not be changed by severing the

common law action and proceeding on it in state court after
recovering compensatory damages in federal court on an Exchange

Act claim. The section 28(a) limitation to "actual damages" still
applies since the section governs collective recovery "in one or more
actions," whether under the Act or not.es Similarly, failure to allege

or pursue the Exchange Act claim would not avoid the application
of the section's limitation. Section 28(a) by its terms applies when
a claimant is "permitted to maintain" an Exchange Act cause of
action, having no requirement that the claimant "actually
maintain" the cause.16
However, although a strict reading of section 28(a) would seem
to require a determination that the section bars all punitive recovery

in the purchase or sale of securities, this result seems totally
unsatisfactory given that Congress likely never considered whether

section 28 (a) would or should affect punitive relief.'6 Moreover, such
a result is not required either by any likely objective of section 28(a)
that Congress intended section 28(a) to govern total recovery from actions both under the Act
and outside the Act. However, as to whether Congress intended to alter by diminution the
measure of recovery available outside the Act, at distinguished from intending not to allow
the Act to increase existing liability in amount, see note 170 infra and accompanying text.
112Punitive recovery could not be had because: (a) plaintiff was "permitted to maintain" a
private cause of action under the Securities Exchange Act, and (b) he was therefore limited
in total recovery to "actual damages." Similarly, since a section 17(a) claim under the
Securities Act of 1933 is also a rule lOb-5 action under the Securities Exchange Act,
F.2d at
, punitive recovery would not be available in a common law fraud suit joined with
a section 17(a) claim since the claimant was "permitted to maintain" a 1934 Act cause.
'"Assuming that Congress consciously intended to limit total liability from an act of
misconduct, whether such liability attached under the Exchange Act or under another theory,
it seems doubtful that such a limitation could be avoided merely by the procedural ploy of
severance of causes.
See text accompanying note 158 supra. In the situation where the claimant was suing in
state court for compensatory and punitive recovery under common law fraud, defendant would
seem to be in the anomalous and almost unworkable position of having to establish that the
claimant could have maintained an action under the Securities Exchange Act.
"'Cf. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 677
(1969).
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or the policies of the Exchange Act. If, by section 28(a), Congress
was evidencing an intention that the Exchange Act was not to be
used as a vehicle for recovery disproportionate to the actual harm
done,' that objective would not be advanced by applying the section
to prohibit exemplary recovery in a common law action." 7 Similarly,
if the intention of Congress through section 28(a) was to"prevent
double compensatory recovery,'68 that function unquestionably
would not be furthered by an extension of the section 28(a)
limitation to punitive damages. Finally, if Congress was intending
to limit liability under the Act by section 28(a), so as to ensure the
Act's effectiveness,' application of the limitation to liability created
outside the Act, which would have attached to the misconduct

regardless of the existence of the Securities Exchange Act, seems
unnecessary. 70
Nowhere in the policies of the Securities Exchange Act, the
objectives of section 28(a), or the legislative history of the Act, is
there a suggestion that Congress was at all interested in altering
liability which existed prior to and independent of the Act.' Thus,
since the purpose of the Exchange Act does not require that all
punitive relief be denied a person defrauded in the purchase or sale
'"See id. at 303.
'That allowing punitive recovery in a common law fraud action would not make the
Exchange Act a vehicle for disproportionate recovery seems apparent from the fact that the
common law action is the basis for the entire recovery. The common law measure of recovery
existed independently of and was neither created nor supplemented by the Securities Exchange
Act.
'"See note 120 supra.
'"See note 121 supra.
" Since Congress in drafting section 28(a) did not intend to expressly proscribe totally
punitive recovery, courts might so apply the section, in fulfillment of the Congressional
purpose, so as to avoid any "striking" of the Act. Yet this is unnecessary for at least two
reasons. First, by virtue of the 1964 amendments, the regulatory scope of the Securities
Exchange Act has been expanded beyond the securities of those corporations registered on
exchanges. See note 146 .upra. Second, corporations could not "strike" the provisions of
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 since their reach is to "any security registered . . . or not
registered." 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969).
"'The language of section 28(a) does establish that Congress was interested in recovery or
liability that existed outside the Act and also the amount of that recovery. However, nothing
in section 28(a) indicated an interest beyond that of how existing liability when combined with
Exchange Act liability could be detrimental for one reason or another. Thus, it could be said
that Congress did not want the Securities Exchange Act to create ultimate liability of an
excessive nature. This would explain the denial of punitive recovery in Green. Similary, this
would explain the ban on double compensatory recovery. Yet, it would not explain a bar of
exemplary damages under a separate claim of common law fraud since the measure of
recovery under that theory was not a creation of the federal statute.

Vol. 1969:1!191]

SECURITIES UNDER WRITERS

of a security, having an express or implied remedy under the statute,
72
section 28 (a) should not be read to give that result.

ISSUER-UNDERWRITER INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENTS

In the area of issuer-underwriter indemnification agreements';
Globus served yet another blow to securities underwriters. These
agreements, although varying in specific language, provide
essentially for indemnification of the "passively" guilty party by the
party whose omissions or misstatements were the source of the
liability.1 7 In typical agreements, each vouches for the information
he provides in the registration statement and prospectus, agreeing to
indemnify the other should the information he provides precipitate
liability. The agreements of indemnification have become even more
'nA suggestion that the Second Circuit would hold section 28(a) not to bar punitive recovery
under a joined common law fraud claim deceptively overstates the ability of a claimant
actually to get exemplary damages in that court. The Second Circuit has several times
indicated its aversion to punitive damages where more than one claimant is involved. See. e.g..
Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc.,
F.2d
,
(2d Cir. 1969); Roginsky v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832. 83841 (2d Cir. 1967). Moreover, the decision in
Roginsky indicates that this aversion will be felt by the claimant to some degree even where
the court is applying state law.
'rThe issuer-underwriter indemnification arrangements, unlike most of those within the
corporate structure, are contractual in nature, being a part of the underwriting agreement
between the issuer and the underwriter of the offering.
The following is illustrative of portions of the normal cross indemnification arrangement:
The Company agrees to indemnify and hold harmless each Underwriter . . . against
any and all losses, claims, damages or liabilities, joint or several, to which they or any
of them may become subject. . . and to reimburse each Underwriter. . . for any legal
or other expenses incurred by them in connection with . . . any such losses, claims,
damages or liabilities. . . insofar as [they] arise out of or are based upon (i) any untrue
statement . . . of a material fact contained in the Registration Statement, or the
omission. . . to state therein a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary
to make the statements therein not misleading. . . or (i) any untrue statement...
of a material fact contained in the Prospectus. . . or the omission. . . to state therein
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein . . . not misleading;
provided, however, that the indemnity agreement . . . shall not apply . . . if such
statement or omission was made in reliance upon information furnished. . . by or on
behalf of any Underwriter for use in connection with the preparation of the
Registration Statement or the Prospectus . ...
PRACISMING LAW INSTITUTE, supra
note 5 1, at 285-86.
Usually, another section of the underwriting agreement similarly provides for indemnification
of the company, its officers and directors if the underwriter should cause the registration
statement or prospectus to contain an untrue statement or omission of a material fact. Id. at
287-88. See also Lockwood and Anderson, Underwriting Contracts. Within the Purview of
Securities Act of 1933; With Certain Suggested Provisions, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 33, 55-58
(1939).
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critical to the underwriter today because of the emergence of
74
securities law civil liabilities in cases such as BarChris.
Though the agreements are universally used in today's
underwriting,"'5 their validity, even prior to Globus, was uncertain.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has suggested that

enforcement of indemnification arrangements between a corporation
and its officers, directors, or controlling persons for liabilities arising

under the Securities Act may be contrary to the policies of the Act.",
However, the Commission has made no comment, either favorable
or unfavorable, on issuer-underwriter agreements.'77 Ostensibly, use
of the agreements would seem unobjectionable since the injured

investor is compensated, and, as between the issuer and the
underwriter, the total liability eventually comes to rest on the
shoulders of the more active wrongdoer. The problem, however, is

that the Securities Act of 1933 clearly puts the compensatory factor
"'Globus undoubtedly has great importance in the area of officer, director, and controlling
persons indemnification arrangements. However, consistent with the subject matter of this
note, the validity of the agreements will be discussed in the underwriter context only.
Consideration given to underwriter indemnification, in light of securities law objectives, is
generally applicable to those indemnification arrangements within the corporate structure.
"'sSee Halleran & Calderwood, supra note 50, at 99.
"'Rule 460 under the Securities Act of 1933 outlines the conditions for acceleration of the
effective date of a registration statement which the Commission requires. Note (a) states that
the Commission may refuse to accelerate the effective date:
Where. . . provision is made for indemnification by the registrant of a director, officer
or controlling person of the registrant against liabilities arising under the act, unless
waiver is obtained from such officer, director or controlling person of the benefits of
such indemnification . . . or there is included in the registration statement a brief
description of the indemnification provision. . . in substantially the following form:
Insofar as indemnification for liabilities arising under the Securities Act of 1933 may
be permitted to directors, officers and controlling persons of the registrant pursuant to
the foregoing provisions, or otherwise, the registrant has been advised that in the
opinion of the Securities and Exchange Commission such indemnification is against
public policy as expressed in the act and is, therefore, unenforceable. In the event that
a claim for indemnification against such liabilities (other than the payment by the
registrant of expenses incurred or paid by a director, officer or controlling person of
the registrant in the successful defense of any action, suit or proceeding) is asserted by
such director, officer or controlling person in connection with the securities being
registered, the registrant will, unless in the opinion of its counsel the matter has been
settled by controlling precedent, submit to a court of appropriate jurisdiction the
question whether such indemnification by it is against public policy as expressed in the
act and will be governed by the final adjudication of such issue. 17 C.F.R. § 230.460
(1969).
This is referred to as the "Johnson & Johnson formula," the requirement first being applied
to the registration statement of that company in 1944. See 3 Loss 1833.
InSee note 223 infra.
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secondary to the disclosure and preventive purposes of the statute. 178
To accomplish this, section 11 has a careful distribution of liability,

among the passively and actively guilty parties alike, designed to
motivate each party to engage in conduct which will advance the

quality of disclosure in each offering. 79 Moreover, Congress likely
intended that underwriters would occupy a significant role in the

disclosure scheme of section 11.1s1 Since the result of indemnification
arrangements is to reallocate this statutory distribution of liability,
and thereby possibly interrupt the operation of this disclosure
scheme, the validity of the agreements is questionable.
Indemnification as a Violation of Express Provisions of the
Securities Act

The first question posed is whether the indemnification
agreement between issuer and underwriter by its operation violates
section 14 of the Securities Act which expressly voids any condition,
stipulation, or provision binding a person acquiring a security to
waive compliance with the Act. 8' In the public offering situation, the

question would be two-fold since there could be two types of

"person [s] acquiring [a] security"-the underwriter and a later

purchaser-who by virtue of an issuer-underwriter indemnification
agreement might be binding themselves directly or indirectly to

waive compliance with the Securities Act.
Where the underwriter is considered the person acquiring the
security, it has been argued that the underwriter is not waiving

compliance with the Act by the issuer, since the underwriter's only
right under the Act, his right to- contribution, remains intact

regardless of the indemnification agreement.'

In order to be

''See note 80 supra; note 218 in fra and accompanying text.
'"Whether the defendant is actively or passively guilty makes no difference as far as the
absolute liability section 11 (a) imposes. All offering participants are liable to the investor and
that liability is not avoided unless the defendant can affirmatively demonstrate his freedom
from culpability-active or passive-under section 11(b). See notes 21-22 supra and
accompanying text.
I" Cf Kroll, Some Reflections on Indenmification Provisions and S. E.C Liability Insurance

in Light of BarChris and Globus, 24 Bus. LAw. 681, 687 (1969). See note 213 infra.
""Section 14 provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person
acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the
rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1964). See 3 Loss
1832 for the suggestion that "any provision for reimbursement of § II liability [might be] in
substance a waiver of compliance with that provision." Id.
'3Note, Indemnification of Underwriters and Section I I of the Securities ..let o 1933, 72
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applicable, section 14 would seem to have three requirements: (1)
that there be some type of exculpatory arrangement purporting to
bind (2) persons acquiring a security (3) not to enforce rights he
would otherwise have to obtain compliance with or a remedy under
the Securities Act. '8 As such, the indemnification agreement would
"bind" the underwriter where the issuer could enforce it against the
underwriter to recoup the issuer's section I1 liability.1U This would
occur only where the underwriter had provided misleading
information for the registration statement and prospectus or had
otherwise caused the same to be misleading, ' which would in turn
mean that the underwriter would be liable under section I I(a).
However, if the underwriter were liable under section 11, he
obviously would have no right of action against the issuer through
which he could compel compliance with the Act."8 6 Therefore, the
third requirement of section 14, that the acquiring person-the
underwriter-could, but for the indemnification agreement, have
required the issuer to comply with the Securities Act would
apparently not be satisfied. 187 Thus, the requirements of section 14
would apparently never be satisfied in the same case where the
underwriter is regarded as the person acquiring the security.
Where later purchasers of a public offering are involved and thus
are considered the persons acquiring the security, the argument is
that the indemnification agreement does not change the ultimate
YALE L.J. 406. 408 (1962). Section I 1() of the Securities Act permits contribution among
those parties liable initially under the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1964). See note 210 infra for
the text of section I (f).
11See note 181 supra for the text ofsection 14.

'"Ifthe issuer is initially liable under section 1I, there can hardly be said to be a waiver of
compliance through an indemnification arrangement if. in fact, the issuer cannot get
indemnification.
'"See note 173 supra for the sample issuer-underwriter indemnification agreement.

'"A right to force compliance with the Securities Act would seem equatable with a cause
of action under the Securities Act for civil recovery. C.

F.2d at

twAn argument might be made that the underwriter's right to force compliance with the

Act lies in his right to contribution under section II(f). Thus, to the extent that the

indemnification agreement would remove that right by allowing the issuer in given situations
to get reimbursement from the underwriter, section 14 would appear to be violated. This

contention seems unsound for two reasons. First, the right to contribution exists in all section
II parties, assuming they can meet the requirements of section II (f). It is not a right which
is created by virtue of the acquisition of a security and peculiar to the acquiring person as
section 14 would seem to contemplate. Second, since section I I(f) permits contribution "as
in cases of contract," the ability of the parties entitled thereto to alter that right by agreement

has never been attacked as a violation of section 14. See Douglas & Bates, supra note 9. at
178-79; 72 YALE L.J.. supra note 182. at 408.
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section 11 liability of the underwriter to the later purchasers and,
therefore, there is no waiver 'Within the meaning of section 14. s8

However, if an underwriter guilty under section 11 (a) and thus liable
to certain purchasers of the issuer's securities is indemnified by the

issuer, in effect the indemnification is coming from the issuer's
shareholders. To the extent that those shareholders were injured
purchasers of the offering in question and, therefore, entitled to

recovery against the underwriter of the offering, the net of the
occurrences is less than total recovery to the purchaser-shareholders

which, in turn, would seem a partial waiver of underwriter
compliance by the purchasers of the offering.'" Yet, this contention
would seem deficient in several respects. Initially, it is hard to see
how a purchaser of an offering is in any way bound to waive
compliance since by choice the purchaser can always terminate his
interest in the corporate issuer prior to the underwriter's attempt at
enforcement of the indemnification arrangement.9 0 Moreover, at

least in the situation of the large public corporation, the percentage
of the underwriter's indemnification borne by each shareholder to

whom the underwriter was originally liable would likely be so small
as to not amount to a waiver by the shareholder-purchaser of his
right to civil recovery. Also, the treatment of the corporate issuer

as just the shareholders thereof is not without difficulties. The
absolute nature of the issuer's liability, making it the insurer of the

veracity of the registration statement, would seem to bear this out."'
1"C*f

72 YAu" L.J..supra note 182. at 408.
'"This position was suggested in Globus. See
l.2d at
. Again, the premise seems
to be that the right to require compliance means the right to enforce fully any liability under
the Securities Act against the non-complying party. Certainly, the initial right to recovery
remains notwithstanding the existence of the issuer-underwriter indemnification agreement.
However, if the underwriter recovers against the issuer, and thus against the issuer's
shareholders, those persons initially recovering against the underwriter who are also
shareholders of the issuer are supposedly recovering less than totally. This, the Globus court
reasoned, was at least reminiscent of the evil sought to be avoided by section 14. Id. at
'"An argument might be made that the shareholder-purchaser would still feel the effect of
the possible enforcement of an indemnification agreement against the issuer through a lower
market price for the issuer's securities discounting the liability. However, this would, arguably,
seem to ignore the likelihood that the shareholder-purchaser could recover that lower market
price differential through his measure of damages under section 11(e) which fixes damages as
the difference between the amount paid for the security and the value of the security at the
time suit was brought. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964). See note 140 supra for the full text of
section I I (e).
"'The absolute nature of the issuer's liability means for all practical purposes that when
there is section II liability for a misleading registration statement or prospectus, the issuer
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Similarly, the right of contribution against the issuer which is given
to all other section II defendants might suggest that the issuer is
something more than a collection of shareholders.'92 There would,
therefore, appear to be no violation of section 14 of the Securities
Act by use of issuer-underwriter indemnification agreements.'93
Indemnification as a Violation of the Public Policy of the Securities
Act
The more difficult question here posed is whether the
enforcement of indemnification agreements is contrary to the public
policy of the statute by undermining its in terrorem operation. "4 A
resolution of this issue may depend on the nature of the
underwriter's liability. Two potential liability situations should be
kept in mind: (1) the underwriter may be guilty of active or willful
misconduct, sufficient in itself to give rise to a cause of action for
securities law fraud 95 as well as a section II claim; and (2) the
underwriter may be guilty of no willful misconduct but may not have
made a reasonable investigation, thus having no defense to a section
11 action." 6
will be one of the liable section I I defendants, either initially or by enforcement of a right to
contribution. Shareholder-purchasers would, therefore, always get less than total recovery.
Inclusion of the issuer within the section I I scheme would seem. then, to reject in part the
view that the issuer is nothing more than a collection of shareholders.
"'If the proposition is accepted that section II defendants may alter by contract their
individual rights to contribution under section II(f) of the Securities Act, see Douglas & Bates.

supra note 9. at 178-79, without violating the commands of section 14. finding section 14 not
to bar indemnification arrangements would seem but one step beyond that.
'"Although the Second Circuit in Globus referred to the section 14 argument against
indemnification of the underwriter by the issuer.
F.2d at
the court's previous
statement that "'the 1933 Act does not deal expressly with the question before us."
F.2d
at
, reflects a feeling that there is no real violation of section 14 in indemnification
arrangements. Thus. the section 14 issue really seems not much more than a restatement of
the basic policy question at hand: Do indemnification arrangements tend to produce conduct
less than due care? Since public policy cain handle almost any question that might arise under
section 14, the application of the latter should be confined to the more obvious case.
11.Vee 3 Loss 1831.
'"Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a). 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964): Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
"'Since the underwriter is guilty of failing to make a due care investigation, this would be
negligent or "passive" misconduct, giving rise only to a section I I or section 12(2) action
against the underwriter. Since the issuer will likely be guilty of "'active" misconduct, this lesser
underwriter culpability would create the more likely situation in which indemnification
arrangements would be permitted.
But see Kroll, supra note 180. "[l]f negligence should be held to provide a basis for damages
under. . . [section 17(a) or rule l0b-5], it can be argued that the public policy considerations
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Willful Misconduct by the Underwriter. Globus presented the
situation of underwriter active misconduct. Recall that the jury
found the underwriter had actual knowledge of the offering circular
omissions and that the resultant lack of action by the underwriter

constituted section 17(a) fraud.

97

When underwriter Blair & Co.

cross-claimed againt the issuer under an indemnification provision

in the underwriting agreement, district court Judge Mansfield
refused enforcement on the grounds that, at least in the case of

"actual knowledge" by the underwriter, such enforcement would
lessen the incentive of thorough investigation and truthfulness on the
part of the underwriter."' The Second Circuit, in affirming the trial
court decision against enforcement of the indemnification agreement,
sanctioned the broad policy grounds employed by Judge

Mansfield.'

This was apparently the first time that a court had

invalidated an indemnification arrangement on the grounds that the
agreement was repugnant to securities law policy.20

Refusal to allow indemnification of an underwriter by an issuer
where the underwriter is guilty of willful misconduct, as in Globus,

is not difficult to understand. Indemnification for intentional failure
to disclose would clearly flaunt even elementary goals of the

Securities Act.

at

Moreover, enforcement of indemnification

provisions where the indemnitee's misconduct is willful is contrary

to the common law notion that a person could not protect himself
202
from liability resulting from his own seriously wrongful acts.
advanced with respect to Sections 1 and 12 of the 1933 Act do not apply and that, here,
indemnification would not be repugnant to the federal securities laws." Id. at 688.
III

F.2d at

"'287 F. Supp. at 199.
in
F.2d at
2The suggestion that indemnification agreements are contrary to the policy of securities
regulation is not a new one. The SEC has long been questioning the validity of the
arrangements in the issuer-officer and dirertor context through the use by the Commission of
their "Johnson & Johnson formula." See note 176 supra. However, no court had ever
approved this policy challenge. Significantly, Globus not only ratified the public policy attack
embodied in rule 460, but also extended it to the issuer-underwriter situation.
201
F.2d at
cf. Section 17(i) of the Investment Company Act which prohibits
agreements that would "protect" a principal underwriter for a registered investment company
"against any liability . . . to which he would otherwise be subject .by reason of willful
misfeasance, bad faith, or gioss negligence, in the performance of his duties." 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-17(i) (1964).
2"A person who has discharged a tort claim to which he and another were subject . . .
(b) is barred from restitution if his tort involved seriously wrongful conduct." RESTATEMENT
OF RESTITUTION § 88 (1937). The comment to clause (b) states:
Public policy prevents restitution in favor of a person who, whether or not by agreement
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Indeed, in Globus the indemnity agreement itself seemed to reflect
this in its language denying Blair any indemnification "by reason of
willful misfeasance, bad faith, or gross negligence in the performance
of [its] duties or by reason of [its] reckless disregard of [its]
obligations and duties under this Agreement.11

3

Therefore, the

gravity of intentional securities law fraud cannot be hidden in
arguments of comparative guilt.y0
Negligent Misconduct bj' the Underwriter. While refusal to

enforce indemnification in the face of active misconduct by the
underwriter is justified, °5 the issue is more difficult where the
underwriter's liability arises from his failure to make an adequate
BarChris investigation.
The language in both the district court and circuit court opinions
in Globus in denying indemnification is easily broad enough to reach
the situation of underwriter negligence. Judge Mansfield set the tenor
of both decisions when he eschewed reliance on the more obvious
arguments for non-enforcement of indemnification agreements where
the indemnitee was guilty of active misconduct, choosing instead the
broader policy grounds for the decisioh'.2 °a Moreover, the district
court's concern with complete preservation of the section I I-created
"motive to investigate" clearly suggests that the Globus rationale

reaches the case of underwriter negligence.27 Similarly, the Second
with or at the request or another, has committed a seriously wrongful act. It is a matter
for judicial discretion to determine whether an act is so seriously wrongful as to bar
restitution under the particular circumstances. Normally consciously criminal conduct
including dishonest conduct involving theft, embezzlement or fraud would be considered
to be seriously wrongful. Likewise, a person is guilty of seriously wrongful conduct if
he acts in reckless disregard of the interests of others, he is reckless if he acts knowing
or having reason to know facts from which a reasonable man would realize that such
conduct involves a high degree of probability of substantial harm to another. Id.,
Comment c at 395-96.
See also W. PROSSER, TORTS § 48 (3d ed. 1964).
U3
F.2d at
n.14. Note that this provision does not exist in the hypothetical agreement
appearing in note 173 supra.
I"Blair apparently argued at the district court level for the proposition that it was less guilty
than Hoppenfeld or Weiner and thus was entitled to indemnification by Law Research. 287
F. Supp. at 199.
3
See Kroll,supranote 180, at 691.
2'287 F. Supp. at 199. See text accompanying notes 201.03 supra for alternative grounds
for not enforcing indemnification agreements against an issuer where the underwriter has
willfully violated the Securities Act.
2"287 F. Supp. at 199. Section I I(b), in providing a section II(a) party with a method to
avoid the liability imposed by the latter provision, creates at least two motives within the
offering participant: (1) a motive to make a reasonable or BarChris investigation, and (2) a
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Circuit in Globus, after expressly confining its consideration to
underwriter misconduct graver than ordinary negligence, emlloyed
a rationale equally applicable to the sin of underwriter negligence.2
Therefore, it is likely that investment bankers are less than
optimistic about the validity of their indemnification agreements.
Professor Loss's position is that any indemnification
arrangement would tend to defeat the in terrorem effect of the
statute, removing the sting of liability, thus reducing the motive to
investigate.2 0 ' In addition, he suggests that enforcement of the
agreements defeats pro tanto the section 11(f) provision for
contribution. 210 Though his analysis is directed chiefly to issuermotive to disclose all that is discovered or known which is material to the registration
statement accompanying the offering. These motives would seem illustrated by the language
of section I I(b)(3)(A) of the Securities Act which requires that the defendant seeking to utilize
due diligence had, "after reasonable investigation [investigation incentive], reasonable ground
to believe and did believe" that the registration statement did not misstate or omit a material
fact [disclosure incentive]. Judge Mansfield was concerned that the enforcement of the
indemnity arrangement in Globus would undermine the motive to investigate. 287 F. Supp.
at 199. Yet, in view of the finding that the underwriter had actual knowledge, the judge's
concern should have been directed toward the motive to disclose. The only time the motive to
investigate would ever be an issue would be in the case of ordinary negligence by the
underwriter. 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 226, 228 (1969>.
n
F.2.d at
. The Second Circuit's policy arguments in Globus were three-pronged.
First, since section II of the Securities Act made directors, experts, signers of the registration
statement, and underwriters jointly liable, and since the SEC had declared that indemnification
of directors, officers, and controlling persons for liability arising under the Act was against
public policy, underwriters should be treated the same as controlling persons and, hence,
similarly precluded from indemnification by the issuer. Id. at
. Second, with the thrust of
the Securities Act being at prevention of injury to the investor through full disclosure,
preservation of the in terrorent operation of the Act was essential. Id. at
. Finally, since
indemnification by the issuer means indemnification by the issuer's shareholders, some of
whom likely had an action initially against the underwriter as purchasers of the offering which
the misleading registration statement accompanied, the net result may be at least reminiscent
of the evil which section 14 was intended to avoid. Id. at
; see note 189 supra and
accompanying text. All of these arguments would seem applicable to the situation of
underwriter negligence.
""[lndemnification] is hostile to the in terrorent effect intended for § I1; negligence in the
preparation of the registration statement was made a basis of civil liability largely in order
to promote careful adherence to the statutory requirements." 3 Loss 183 1.
21
1d. Section I I (f)of the Securities Act provides:
All or any one or more of the persons specified in subsection (a) of this section shall
be jointly and severally liable, and every person who becomes liable to make any
payment under this section may recover contribution as in cases of contract from any
person who, if sued separately, would have been liable to make the same payment,
unless the person who has become liable was, and the other was not, guilty of
fraudulent misrepresentation. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1964).
But see 72 YALE L.J.. supra note 182, at 408.
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officer, director, or controlling persons indemnification
arrangements, arguably it applies equally in the issuer-underwriter
context. 2 1 Enforcement of indemnification agreements where the
underwriter has not successfully defended against an action under
section 11 would seem to defeat the objectives and violate the public
policy of the Securities Act. 21 The suggestions in the legislative
history and in BarChris that within the general scheme of disclosure
each section II party has an important, individual investigatory role
to play support this view. 2 3 Agreements tending to reduce the in
211See

generally 72 YALE L.J., supra note 182. Arguably, Professor Loss's contentions also

reach lead-syndicate indemnification arrangements. If syndicate underwriters, to satisfy their
investigatory requirements, seek to rely on the originating house's perusal, they may require
indemnification guarantees in the agreement among underwriters for protection in case the
lead underwriter fails to satisfy due diligence. Or they may seek recovery against the main
underwriter on a theory of agency, the principal house being the agent of the syndicate for
the purposes of making a BarChris investigation. Unquestionably, recovery in either case
alters the contribution provision of section I1(f). See note 210 supra. The in terrorent
argument, however, presents a more difficult problem. The fact that a court might accept the
syndicate's argument that it may delegate to and rely on the lead house for satisfaction of
investigatory due diligence would seem to make the "preservation of the motive to investigate"
a bit pointless. However, it would not seem unreasonable to think that a court might find
refusal of enforcement of lead-syndicate indemnification arrangements not unbearably
inconsistent with approval of the participating underwriters' right to rely on the lead
underwriter. The fact that the syndicate reliance on the managing underwriter may itself
present a theoretical deviation from the statute might motivate a court to say that it was not
prepared to allow a syndicate member the delegation of his liability as well as his investigation
requirements.
212
"The practical significance of the statutory liability of underwriters is substantially
limited, however, by the accepted practice of indemnification of underwriters by issuers."
Cohen, supra note 8, at 1383 n. 124.
Blair argued in Globus that the contention that agreements of indemnification in the
securities context undermined the in terrorenm operation of the Securities Act was little more
than the commonly rejected proposition that "indemnification tends to produce negligence on
the part of the indemnitee." Brief of Defendant-Appellant and Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant
at 45. Yet a court considering the Securities Act might more strictly review this contention
since the very.success of the Act, full disclosure, rests on the deterrent pressure exerted by the
prospect of civil liability. See text immediately following note 17 supra. The usual concern
for compensation of the injured party, which indemnification does not disturb, is supposedly
of secondary importance and not, in itself, sufficient justification for retaining the agreements.
But see note 220 infra and accompanying text.
13
See text accompanying note 46 supra. Moreover, there is ample evidence to establish the
congressional intention to impose a "high standard of trusteeship" on underwriters. See
Kroll, supra note 180, at 687. For a rather strong indictment of the investment banking
community generally which would account, in part, for the high standard placed on
underwriters, see H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., IstSess. 2 (1933). Also, Judge McLean's
statement in BarChris that the statutory obligations of an underwriter do not differ from those
of officers and directors clearly supports the extension of the "Johnson & Johnson formula"
to issuer-underwriter indemnification agreements. 283 F. Supp. at 696.
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terrorem effect on one party might cause the entire scheme of full
disclosure to fail.
However, although a theoretical inconsistency between
indemnification agreements and the public policy of the Securities
Act doubtlessly exists, the question of whether the agreements do in

fact promote a level of conduct lower than "due diligence" remains
unanswered. If it could be established that civil liability were the

only adverse consequence of negligence to the finderwriter, the
question might easily be answered in the affirmative. Yet, there are
substantial non-civil liability consequences that may result from lack
of due care. First, there is the usual ignominy that accompanies
being a negligence defendant and suffering liability.214 This would
seem substantially magnified in the investment banking business
where the underwriter's reputation may be the single most important

product that he has to market.

5

Second, significant disciplinary

sanctions by the Securities and Exchange Commission exist such as

suspension or revocation of broker-dealer registration and censure to
216
which the underwriter violating the Securities Act may be subject.

Obviously, no protection from these consequences could be realized
through indemnification. Finally, there is the natural uncertainty of
reimbursement where such reimbursement is dependent on the

solvency of another-the issuer. The underwriter can never be
completely free of the deterrent pressure of civil liability itself since

in the end, he may find it on his shoulders to stay.
Significantly, in other fields, the proposition that
indemnification encourages negligence has been generally rejected,
even though the non-civil liability deterrent forces were not as
21

,Cf.
Northern Pac. R.R. v. Thornton Bros., 206 Minn. 193, 288 N.W. 226 (1939); Kurek
v. Port Chester Housing Authority, 18 N.Y.2d 450, 223 N.E.2d 25, 276 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1966);
6 S. WILLISTON. CONTRACTS § 1751 (S.Williston & J. Thompson ed., 1938).
1
2 1"The
primary thing an underwriter has to sell is his reputation and his services."
PRACTISING LAW INsTITUTE. supra note 51, at 43. Cf.Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc.,
F.2d
(2d Cir. 1969); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832,
841 (2d Cir. 1967).
The importance of underwriter reputation would seem, however, vulnerable to attack in the
small investment banking house situation. He has little reputation to offer the issuer, yet he
seems to underwrite the bulk of the new offerings. See SPECIAL STUDY pt. 1,493-95. However,
this overstates the case on the other side. Protection of the motive to investigate in the small
underwriter is of little value since these houses are frequently undercapitalized and not
impressed by the liability attendant to a securities law violation. Id. at 493-95, 513-14.
21,15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(5) (1964). Cf.66 HARV. L. REv. 543, 543-44 (1953). The Globus
court cited the non-civil liability sanctions as a substantial deterrent force when considering
the punitive damages issue.
F.2d at
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substantial as here. 217 However, the Globus court found this

authority "not necessarily apposite," since "[t]he goal in such cases
[was] to compensate the injured party" while "the Securities Act
[was] more concerned with prevention than cure."218 Although this
is clearly a fair description of the operation of the Securities Act, it
seems difficult to explain how that alone would make irrelevant case

law tending to answer a causality question which is equally present
211
in either situation: Does indemnification encourage negligence?
Moreover, the basic determination that the Act is more preventive
oriented may itself be approaching the irrelevant and artificial as
adequate paths to remedy, become available to the small investor and
sections 11 and 12(2) causes of action begin to blend into the implied
civil remedies of section 17(a) and rule lOb-5. 220 Against any
marginally added care that might be yielded by denying the
underwriter indemnification, the adverse economic repercussions
-n'
See note 214 supra.
"
F.2d at
This position was also expressed in 72 YALE L.J., supra note 182, at
408.
2"To the extent that the cases in other fields suggest that indemnification was permitted
simply because compensation for injury was all that was necessary and that no deterrent
objective was sought, those cases would be inappropriate. However, since the causation
question was considered in some of the cases, see note 214 supra, they cannot all be
characterized as having no deterrent goals.
n2The provisions of the Securities Act of course demonstrate that compensation to an
injured investor is one goal of the Act. However, because individual injury in many cases
involving the civil liabilities sections could be expected to be of an insufficient size to provoke
the investor to legal action, to provide merely for compensation would clearly not accomplish
the remedial action necessary. Thus, the Act had to have a "preventive" orientation, which
in turn required a statutory design that was heavy with deterrent forces.
Today, the problem of the small individual injury has been remedied substantially by the
F.2d at
Also, section 17(a) of the Securities
class action and the derivative suit.
Act and rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act are remedial in nature. Indeed, both were
created because of a remedial need. One writer suggests, therefore, that indemnification
arrangements would, arguably, not violate the public policy of these two provisions. See Kroll,
supra note 180, at 688. Thus, as these two provisions overlap with section II in areas of
unintentional conduct, the remedial versus preventive objective of the Act becomes somewhat
irrelevant.
As the compensatory objective of the Securities Act becomes more important, a new policy
objection to indemnification agreements may be created. Investors suing under the Act for
recovery of liability that occurred where there was a misleading registration statement may
still be stockholders in the issuer. If an underwriter enforces his indemnification agreement
against the issuer, investor-stockholders will suffer a dilution of recovery which might likely
F. 2d at ; note 189 supra and accompanying
be in violation of the policy of the Act. Cf
text. Dilution could be avoided, however, by selling prior to suit, and recovering any discount
the market might make for the impending enforcement of an indemnification claim through
an increased measure of damages. See note 190 supra.
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must be considered. It seems safe to assume that the reputable
underwriter will not handle the offerings of smaller issuers without
some protection from the risks of liability under the Securities
Act.Y' Such a refusal by established houses might cause the bulk of
the issues of these small companies to fall into the hands of less
experienced and financially unsound underwriters. " Yet, assuming
that it is neither the duty nor the desire of the government to deny
smaller issuers access to the public capital market, it is this very
case-the small, inexperienced issuer-in which the goal should be
to encourage the best underwriting possible, hoping that reputable
houses will mean scrutiny and disclosureYm
If the better investment banking houses will not underwrite the
offerings of small issuers without protection from liability, it would,
therefore, seem incumbent on the courts to allow the underwriter
some shield from liability. Since both indemnification and
insurance24 appear to accomplish this end, it may be just a matter
121
Kroll, supra note 180, at 689. See note 222 infra.
"See SPECIAL STUDY pt. 1, 503-04. As of 1961, small underwriting houses of questionable
experience and modest capital were already managing the issue of nearly one half of the new
offerings. With the flood of new offerings since then, the share managed by small houses has
probably increased significantly. Id. at 493-95.
inSignificantly, the Securities Exchange Commission has not chosen to expose issuerunderwriter indemnification arrangements to the sanctions placed on similar arrangements by
the Commission. See note 176 supra. Arguably, by negative implication, the SEC has
approved the use of the arrangements by underwriters. The widespread use of the agreements
supplies additional credence to the proposition that the Commission has impliedly approved
of the use of issuer-underwriter indemnification agreements. Indeed, we may be dealing with
more than approval by negative implication: "Item 29 [of Form S-I] cals for information
with respect to the indemnification of officers and directors and controlling persons of the
issuer. As has been mentioned, it is the usual practice to idemnify underwriters, and the
Commission is not concerned with the indemnification of underwriters as such." PRACTISING
LAW INsTITUTE. supra note 5 1, at 147 (Charles E. Shreve, former Chief Counsel, Division of
Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission).
This somewhat anomalous position of the Commission might be explained by "the fears
egpressed during the early days of the Act that underwriters would be unwilling to assume
the full risks of § I1." 3 Loss 1835. Indeed, the apparent present position of the reputable
house to avoid offerings where the risk of some liability is relatively high or to back out of an
offering where the events or conditions surrounding the issue become unacceptable in many
ways supports this view. Assuming that an issuer will usually want an underwriter, especially
where the issuer is a novice at a public offering with no real market for its securities, the
result will be that less reputable houses will be handling the offerings most in need of careful
underwriter scrutiny.
22The uncertainty created by Globus, alone, may be enough to encourage underwriters to
look more to insurance than to indemnification agreements for protection against lack of due
care. The underwriter has a choice of basically two types of insurance policies. One is the
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specific issue policy, which would protect the underwriter against Securities Act liability
arising from a particular public offering. Although terms may vary, this type of policy would
probably cover not only the underwriter, but also the directors, officers, and controlling
persons of the issuer. In the case of a large issue, coverage would likely be for no more than
50 percent of the offering price. Usually, most of the premium would fall on the shoulders of
She issuer. The other alternative in insurance is the blanket coverage policy which would be
purchased by the underwriter, typically for a one year period, to protect him against securities
law liabilities incurred in any underwriting in which he participated during the policy period.
Such a policy would most likely be available only to the more reputable houses, and it may
have as a condition to recovery that eitger the underwriter seek indemnification from the issuer
or that specific-issue insurance be obtained for at least 25.percent of the offering price. Though
the underwriter himself purchases the blanket coverage policy, generally he will pass the cost
on to the issuer through an increased underwriter discount. Neither type of policy provides
for payment if the underwriter is guilty of active misconduct.
However, insurance may not be the answer to the underwriter's desire for protection against
his own negligence. It is by no means settled that insurance protection would not be attacked
on the grounds that it violates the public policy of securities law. The underwriter still enjoys
the protection from liability in the situation of underwriter negligence, in which case Professor
Loss's argument that there is no fear of liability to move the underwriter to investigate would
still seem to apply. The threat of increased premiums for the underwriter's past misconduct
may be of little deterrence to the underwriter if it is the issuer who will, in most cases, pick
up the bill.
In addition, -a new public policy factor emerges. Whereas previously the issuer was deterred
to some extent from active misconduct by the threat that he might have to bear the entire
liability through enforcement of indemnity arrangements, now he no longer need worry about
that device shifting to him the additional liability burden. The increased net return from
misconduct may make the risk of discovery worth assuming.
In addition to these arguments, other considerations are present. The cost of these policies
has risen sharply and it is, at most, doubtful that cases like arChrisand Globus will reverse
that trend. The uncertainty of securities law aside, insurance companies might refuse to write
policies without substantially larger premiums where the issuer and his security are small, or
new, and of an uncertain risk. No doubt this will be the very situation where the underwriter
would most likely demand the protection of insurance, yet be unwilling to assume any
additional cost. The issuer may be unable to assume it. Another potential situation for a
higher premium would be the case of the underwriter that has been involved in prior litigation
and has collected on an underwriting policy. Aside from the general adverse effect the prior
liability would have on the reputation of the house, rightly or wrongly, that underwriter will
e at a severe competitive disadvantage in simple economic terms in the competition for future
offerings.
Assuming that insurance contracts might be invalidated on a rationale similar to that
invoked against indemnification arrangements, interesting enforcement problems are also
raised. Who has standing, to contest the validity of*the insurance protection on public policy
grounds? What is to be done in the situation when the underwriter's insurance policy is
declared void as against public policy, and the insurance company still pays the claim to the
underwriterq Enforcement in this area might therefore depend on administrative sanctions of
the SEC.
It seems a realistic appraisal, then, to say that the court that extends Globus to invalidate
indemnification agreements will not be settling the issue of underwriter protection against lack
of due diligence. Instead, the extension of Globus will signal a new round in the underwriter's
search for protection against his own negligence. See H. SOWARDS. THE FEDERAL SECURITIES
ACT § 9.06[4] (1965); Kroll, supra note 180, at 685-87, 690; Painter. supra note 110, at 195.
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of choice between them.2 25 At present, insurance protection is
expensive. Courts might determine it to be the underwriter's sole
protection from liability,2 s but, since the issuer will likely always
bear the cost or premium, a question could be raised as to whether
this constant addition might not be a needless cost on capital,
thereby making indemnification agreements more advantageous.m
On the other hand, in the small issuer situation, the underwriter
likely will not rely solely on an indemnification provision in the
underwriting agreement, but will also have some insurance
protection. The best resolution by the courts then would be to allow
both, leaving it to the underwriter and issuer to decide whether they
will use an indemnification arrangement or insurance for protection
against securities law liability for negligence.
CONCLUSION

BarChris, Globus, and their companions have opened to judicial
scrutiny areas of securities law which had previously been a domain
for speculation by academicians. Providing the answers to the
questions raised by these judicial explorations will apparently be the
unenviable task of future courts. And it is likely that these courts
will adhere to the same securities law policy as that in BarChris and
Globus-preservation and full operation of the mechanics of
securities regulation to give the investor the most complete and
accurate information possible. The courts seem ready, as BarChris
and Globus illustrate, to protect the disclosure objective from any
practice which might erode it and to sanction almost any change
which might enhance it. One suggestion can be offered. Resort
should be made to extrinsic considerations such as financial
practicalities and common practices which are reasonable given the
total situation. Guarding against "logical" or "theoretical"
"One criticism of indemnification by the issuer to which underwriter insurance would not
be subject would be that the issuer's shareholders are the source of the reimbursement of the
underwriter. However, the investor generally will still be the eventual source since he will likely

always bear the cost of the insurance.
22 1

At least one person has suggested that the courts may likely choose to allow the
underwriter to rely on insurance, while denying him the use of indemnification agreements with

the issuer. See Kroll, supra note 180, at 692.

22 7
ndemnification agreements meant "expense" to the issuer only when the issuer had
caused section II civil liability to arise, and the underwriter had successfully enforced the
agreement. With insurance, the issuer will have a new fixed cost on the offering, regardless of
whether his actions eventually cause misrepresentation resulting in section I I liability.
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inconsistencies and viewing securities law as isolated from outside
factors hardly yields "protection to the public with the least possible
interference to honest business."

